Judicial deference to administrative interpretations in the USA and conclusions for Ukraine: do judges respect lawmakers?

Using comparative analysis author established that since 1820 Supreme Court of the USA had introduced a new doctrine of judicial deference which makes judges (1) show respect towards administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutes and/or regulations issued by the Agencies. Later, after Seminole Rock (1945), Chevron (1984) та Auer (1997) a simple “respect” grew into “obligation” of judges to pay deference to such interpretations even if judges do not agree with such and there is another “reasonable” interpretation. It is emphasized on the case Loper Bright (2024) where Court overruled Chevron as contradictory to Administrative Procedure Act and stated that courts may not defer to agencies interpretations of statutes just because they happen to be ambiguous. When two or more possible interpretations is possible, a court has to choose its own variant, not that of administrative agency. However, question of self-interpretation by Agencies has not been answered by the Court yet. The author posed the following questions: (1) How Law on Administrative Procedure of Ukraine and other normative Acts regulate the interpretation of ambiguous laws and other regulations? (2) What is the legal force of elucidations (clarifications) of laws and regulations in Ukraine, and whether judges pay any respect to them? (3) What could and should be the role of Verkhovna Rada`s Committees in giving interpretation of laws, and what potential weight of such in courts of law? The decisions of Ukrainian courts have been studied where judges pay attention and, de facto, use non-judicial interpretations made by Committees of Parliament and Ministries. In the Article, based on the method of “inclusive observation”, the author had sent dozens of requests for interpretations to the Verkhovna Rada`s Committees and ministries during 2023-2025 and received the answers. Author has figured out the system of relations between the Committees of Parliament and Ministries when they respond to the author`s requests for interpretation of legal rules (internal and external delegations). The author proved the positive effect on legal certainty because of publication of legal clarifications on the official website of the legislative or executive body. In some instances, there can even be amendments to a law in response to the request for clarification of a legal norm. In conclusion, inter alia, it is recommended to grant Skidmore deference to administrative interpretations and render Chevron/Auer deference to Committees of Parliament. The author also criticizes the references in Ministries` or Committees’ interpretive letters to the “recommendatory” or “informative” nature of clarifications, as well as the phrase that they do not “contain legal norms”.