Double optimization dispatch for orderly electricity utilization under subsidy incentives in a multi agent game

The orderly electricity consumption is currently a primary approach to address the power supply–demand imbalance during peak periods in the power system. Typically, this approach is centrally managed and controlled by power grid operators, resulting in limited user participation and insufficient utilization of demand-side flexibility. Load aggregators can integrate loads to actively engage in orderly electricity consumption, supporting grid stable and economically efficient operation of the power grid during peak hours. This paper proposes an optimal bidding strategy for load aggregators and establishes a two-layer optimization of orderly electricity consumption with the participation of load aggregators. The upper-layer model is based on a non-cooperative game model that maximizes the revenue for load aggregators, while the lower-layer is Stackelberg game model with minimal user loss. The solution of the lower-layer is substituted back into the upper-layer model. Then, the two-layer game model is jointly solved to achieve the Nash equilibrium, yielding optimal and stable strategies for users, load aggregators, and the grid company. Finally, an example is simulated for validation. It is shown that the proposed method can effectively balance the economic benefits among those three parties to facilitates mutual benefits.