A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Among Autonomous Systems in Network Federations

This paper investigates cooperative behavior among Autonomous Systems (ASs) within a federated network environment designed to support collaborative shared-technology deployment. It makes use of the concept of an AS federation, where independently managed systems adhere to a shared standard while maintaining implementation flexibility. Using a systematic game-theoretic framework, the study models various coalition structures—including full cooperation, partial coalitions, and defection—across several canonical cooperative games. The analysis evaluates the effects of different cooperation strategies and resource-sharing schemes on payoff distribution and coalition stability. Simulation results over short- and medium-to-long-term horizons demonstrate that cooperative coalition formation, especially with fair payoff allocation, consistently outperforms solitary strategies. The study also identifies key thresholds affecting partial coalition viability and explores the impact of defection on overall federation performance. By linking theoretical game models with practical deployment challenges in heterogeneous networked systems, this work offers valuable insights for designing mechanisms that promote effective cooperation in complex, resource-constrained environments.