Logical foundations of analogy of law and analogy of legislation in Russian legal philosophy

Abstract: Analogy is not only a logical method of reasoning, but also a methodological approach of philosophy and legal theory. Unfortunately, the popular Hegelian interpretation of analogy from the “Small Logic” has had a negative impact on the discussion around the analogy of law and the analogy of the legislation, which creates a certain methodological uncertainty and ambiguity in scientific works devoted to the theory of law. The purpose of the study: clarifying the essence and the specificity of the analogy method in the field of law, conducting a formal and meaningful differentiation of the concepts of “analogy of law” and “analogy of legislation.” The sources for the study are international law and legislation of Russian, including the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Methods: comparative-system, Lon Fuller’s procedural theory, topic, logic and hermeneutics, deduction and induction, syllogistics and Mill’s canons, analogy of objects and analogy of relations, demonstrative analogy or “strict.” Results. The thesis is substantiated that in legal ideology today there is a biased attitude towards analogy as an exceptional method of legal technique, which is used primarily in connection with the so-called gap in legislation or the logic of search work in forensicinvestigative practice, or as a metaphysical attitude. The paper reveals the logical grounds for the possible (procedural) application of analogy in legal epistemology and branches of law, and also substantiates the thesis that the method of analogy in the process of its application can lead to logical conclusions that are not only demonstrative, but also heuristically and methodologically significant.