An evolutionary game model of energy transition and carbon reduction governance: The role of public welfare lawsuits

Effective carbon reduction in the energy sector requires coordinated efforts from governments, enterprises, and the public. This study incorporates public welfare lawsuits into a tripartite evolutionary game model involving these actors to analyze their strategic interactions in energy transition and carbon reduction governance. Using system dynamics simulations, the study evaluates both pure and mixed strategies and conducts sensitivity analyses on key exogenous variables. Results indicate that the most stable evolutionary outcome arises when governments adopt active regulatory strategies, enterprises pursue technological innovation, and the public engages in participation and supervision. The government's regulatory cost reduces its willingness to regulate actively, while higher expected losses from conventional production increase enterprises' inclination toward green innovation. For the public, high participation costs in judicial supervision discourage involvement. This research contributes a novel framework for multi-stakeholder co-governance, underscores the practical role of public welfare lawsuits, and broadens the application of evolutionary game theory. • Multi-stakeholder coordination is key for effective carbon reduction. • Public welfare lawsuits shape strategies in carbon governance. • Active government, innovative enterprises, and engaged public stabilize outcomes. • System dynamics reveal costs and incentives influencing stakeholder choices.