Multi‐objective bilevel operational optimization of low‐carbon cement industries with integrated energy systems

Abstract Cement industries generate significant CO 2 emissions, necessitating carbon capture and utilization (CCU) schemes for their abatement. This study proposes a bilevel Stackelberg game framework, where government and integrated energy systems (IES) regulate ladder‐type carbon taxes and time‐of‐use (TOU) electricity pricing, while cement plants optimize the allocation ratio between two CO 2 handling methods (direct CO 2 emissions and hydrogen‐assisted CO 2 processing). The resulting nonconvex mixed‐integer nonlinear program (MINLP) features a nonconvex upper level and a convex lower level, solved to global optimality using Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) reformulation. Compared to the single cement model, the bilevel model reduces total CO 2 handling costs by 68.4% ($705,855/d) and the related emissions by 27.6% (506 ton/d). Sensitivity analysis indicates that higher carbon taxes reduce CO 2 emissions but raise handling costs, while lower electricity prices decrease them both. These findings establish a foundation for cement‐IES integration, enabling policymakers to balance environmental‐economic performance through carbon tax and electricity pricing adjustments.