Harmonising Indonesia’s CBRN Policy with the IHR and WHO–UNODA Frameworks

Indonesia is increasingly vulnerable to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, driven by regional geopolitical tensions, natural hazards, and the rapid evolution of biological technologies. While the country has developed various laws and sectoral regulations to manage these risks, its current policy landscape remains fragmented and lacks systematic alignment with global standards. The absence of an integrated national strategy limits Indonesia’s ability to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to CBRN emergencies. This study investigates the extent to which Indonesia’s existing CBRN policies align with two critical international frameworks: the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) and the guiding principles of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in biosecurity and disarmament. Using a qualitative document-based approach, this research analysed national legislation, ministerial decrees, strategic plans, and relevant international conventions. Thematic content analysis was applied to evaluate policy alignment with IHR core capacities, such as surveillance, legal frameworks, coordination, and emergency response, as well as WHO–UNODA principles, including dual-use oversight, biological disarmament, and research governance. The analysis reveals major policy and institutional gaps. CBRN governance in Indonesia is dispersed among multiple agencies, BNPB, BAPETEN, Kementerian Kesehatan, BNPT, and TNI, each operating within its own silo. There is no overarching coordinating body or comprehensive legal framework to unify efforts. Moreover, critical areas such as dual-use research oversight, bio-threat intelligence sharing, and international reporting obligations remain poorly developed. Integration with IHR and WHO–UNODA protocols is limited and largely ad hoc. To improve national preparedness and resilience, Indonesia must pursue comprehensive legal reform and establish a national CBRN coordination body. Embedding international norms, such as the IHR and WHO–UNODA guidance, into domestic policy frameworks will enhance inter-agency coherence and align Indonesia’s biosecurity governance with global best practices.

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Journal
Global Biosecurity
Published
2025-10-14
DOI
https://doi.org/10.31646/gbio.331
Primary Topic
Public Health and Nutrition
Type
article
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article

Harmonising Indonesia’s CBRN Policy with the IHR and WHO–UNODA Frameworks

Aris Sarjito
Global Biosecurity
Public Health and Nutrition
article

Harmonising Indonesia’s CBRN Policy with the IHR and WHO–UNODA Frameworks

Aris Sarjito
article en

Abstract

Indonesia is increasingly vulnerable to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, driven by regional geopolitical tensions, natural hazards, and the rapid evolution of biological technologies. While the country has developed various laws and sectoral regulations to manage these risks, its current policy landscape remains fragmented and lacks systematic alignment with global standards. The absence of an integrated national strategy limits Indonesia’s ability to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to CBRN emergencies. This study investigates the extent to which Indonesia’s existing CBRN policies align with two critical international frameworks: the International Health Regulations (IHR 2005) and the guiding principles of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) in biosecurity and disarmament. Using a qualitative document-based approach, this research analysed national legislation, ministerial decrees, strategic plans, and relevant international conventions. Thematic content analysis was applied to evaluate policy alignment with IHR core capacities, such as surveillance, legal frameworks, coordination, and emergency response, as well as WHO–UNODA principles, including dual-use oversight, biological disarmament, and research governance. The analysis reveals major policy and institutional gaps. CBRN governance in Indonesia is dispersed among multiple agencies, BNPB, BAPETEN, Kementerian Kesehatan, BNPT, and TNI, each operating within its own silo. There is no overarching coordinating body or comprehensive legal framework to unify efforts. Moreover, critical areas such as dual-use research oversight, bio-threat intelligence sharing, and international reporting obligations remain poorly developed. Integration with IHR and WHO–UNODA protocols is limited and largely ad hoc. To improve national preparedness and resilience, Indonesia must pursue comprehensive legal reform and establish a national CBRN coordination body. Embedding international norms, such as the IHR and WHO–UNODA guidance, into domestic policy frameworks will enhance inter-agency coherence and align Indonesia’s biosecurity governance with global best practices.

Global Biosecurity
Indonesia Defense University (ID)
Openalex Percentile: Top 59%
Public Health and Nutrition
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