Model‐Based Semantics: Doing Without Meaning Constitution

Abstract This paper introduces a model‐based account of meaning, arguing that meaning properties reside in models rather than in the external world. Building on this view, it explores how such an instrumentalist framework can engage critically with various concerns raised by Wittgenstein, Quine, and Kripke[nstein]—each of whom voiced scepticism toward certain conceptions of semantic theorising and, in some cases, the reification of meaning. While the scope and nature of their respective criticisms may differ, the paper suggests they share a broadly deflationary attitude toward semantic metaphysics. Twentieth‐century challenges to mainstream truth‐conditional semantics, from verificationism, inferentialism, and other alternatives, have further complicated the semantic landscape, prompting a reconsideration of metaphysical assumptions in theories of meaning. In light of both scepticism about meaning and explanatory disagreement in semantics, the paper questions the metaphysical interpretation of theories of meaning and proposes a reoriented understanding of semantic theorising—one that is formally tractable yet philosophically restrained.