Psychological elitism

Abstract Elites can be differentiated from non-elites by their status-enhancing attributes: their accomplishments, expertise, and group memberships. Elitism is the belief that elites deserve epistemic deference because they better understand the workings of the world. Psychological elitism posits the existence of a class of elites who possess specialized knowledge of subconscious (motivational and cognitive) drivers of human judgment that is beyond the ken of non-elites. This article challenges whether psychological elites deserve deference. The central problem is the elusiveness of ground-truth standards for determining the true drivers of judgments. To warrant deference, psychological elites must demonstrate that their reasoning operates free of the same subconscious distortions ascribed to non-elites. Absent such demonstrations, it is fair game—under the very theories that psychological elites endorse—to question the competence of psychological elites to second-guess the true reasons underlying the views of non-elites.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Theory and Society
Published
2025-10-13
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-025-09643-1
Primary Topic
Social and Intergroup Psychology
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Psychological elitism

Philip E. Tetlock, Gregory Mitchell
Theory and Society
Social and Intergroup Psychology
article

Psychological elitism

Philip E. Tetlock, Gregory Mitchell
article en

Abstract

Abstract Elites can be differentiated from non-elites by their status-enhancing attributes: their accomplishments, expertise, and group memberships. Elitism is the belief that elites deserve epistemic deference because they better understand the workings of the world. Psychological elitism posits the existence of a class of elites who possess specialized knowledge of subconscious (motivational and cognitive) drivers of human judgment that is beyond the ken of non-elites. This article challenges whether psychological elites deserve deference. The central problem is the elusiveness of ground-truth standards for determining the true drivers of judgments. To warrant deference, psychological elites must demonstrate that their reasoning operates free of the same subconscious distortions ascribed to non-elites. Absent such demonstrations, it is fair game—under the very theories that psychological elites endorse—to question the competence of psychological elites to second-guess the true reasons underlying the views of non-elites.

Theory and SocietyVol. 54(6)
University of Virginia (US), University of Pennsylvania (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 62%
Social and Intergroup Psychology
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.