Psychological elitism
Abstract Elites can be differentiated from non-elites by their status-enhancing attributes: their accomplishments, expertise, and group memberships. Elitism is the belief that elites deserve epistemic deference because they better understand the workings of the world. Psychological elitism posits the existence of a class of elites who possess specialized knowledge of subconscious (motivational and cognitive) drivers of human judgment that is beyond the ken of non-elites. This article challenges whether psychological elites deserve deference. The central problem is the elusiveness of ground-truth standards for determining the true drivers of judgments. To warrant deference, psychological elites must demonstrate that their reasoning operates free of the same subconscious distortions ascribed to non-elites. Absent such demonstrations, it is fair game—under the very theories that psychological elites endorse—to question the competence of psychological elites to second-guess the true reasons underlying the views of non-elites.
Authors
- Philip E. Tetlock
- Gregory Mitchell (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0622-1061)
Institutions
- University of Virginia (US)
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Theory and Society
- Published
- 2025-10-13
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-025-09643-1
- Primary Topic
- Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00