Public Health, Xenozoonosis, and the Right to Withdraw from Long Term Xenotransplant Biosurveillance

Is it ethically defensible to remove xenotransplant recipients' right to withdraw from long term biosurveillance on grounds of theoretically possible but potentially excessive third-party risk? Some think so arguing that to protect public health from potential infectious diseases originating in the xenograft, xenotransplant recipients should not be allowed to withdraw from long term biosurveillance. We present a dilemma for this view: if xenotransplant research poses such significant risk to public health as to warrant the requirement that xenotransplant recipients voluntarily waive their right to withdraw, then the research warrants long term quarantine. If the risk is not so great as to require long term quarantine, however, then individuals should not have to forfeit this right in order to participate in xenotransplant research. Either way, xenotransplant recipients should not be required to waive their right to withdraw from long term biosurveillance.

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Publication Details

Journal
The New Bioethics
Published
2025-10-02
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/20502877.2025.2572255
Primary Topic
Xenotransplantation and immune response
Type
article
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article

Public Health, Xenozoonosis, and the Right to Withdraw from Long Term Xenotransplant Biosurveillance

Christopher Alan Bobier, Daniel J. Hurst, Adam Omelianchuk, Daniel Rodger
The New Bioethics
Xenotransplantation and immune response
article

Public Health, Xenozoonosis, and the Right to Withdraw from Long Term Xenotransplant Biosurveillance

Christopher Alan Bobier, Daniel J. Hurst, Adam Omelianchuk, Daniel Rodger
article en

Abstract

Is it ethically defensible to remove xenotransplant recipients' right to withdraw from long term biosurveillance on grounds of theoretically possible but potentially excessive third-party risk? Some think so arguing that to protect public health from potential infectious diseases originating in the xenograft, xenotransplant recipients should not be allowed to withdraw from long term biosurveillance. We present a dilemma for this view: if xenotransplant research poses such significant risk to public health as to warrant the requirement that xenotransplant recipients voluntarily waive their right to withdraw, then the research warrants long term quarantine. If the risk is not so great as to require long term quarantine, however, then individuals should not have to forfeit this right in order to participate in xenotransplant research. Either way, xenotransplant recipients should not be required to waive their right to withdraw from long term biosurveillance.

The New BioethicsVol. 31(2-4)
Central Michigan University (US), Baylor College of Medicine (US), London South Bank University (GB), Rowan University (US)
Openalex Percentile: Top 55%
Xenotransplantation and immune response
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Public Health, Xenozoonosis, and the Right to Withdraw from Long Term Xenotransplant Biosurveillance — Christopher Alan Bobier, Daniel J. Hurst, et al. · The New Bioethics (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS