XII—Socrates and Dialogue as the Greatest Good

Abstract This paper argues that Socratic dialogue is not a value-neutral practice, with ethical value entering the frame only via its content (discussion of the virtues); nor is it solely an instrumental tool to secure a valuable end-product (a definition). I argue in favour of three positive claims. Claim 1 is that dialogue is a value-laden practice. What we tend to suppose are value-neutral norms, such as cooperation, a mutually accepted direction, checking whether a position has been understood before drawing conclusions, and so on, involve ethical values. This explains the prevalence of language familiar from the ethical domain to describe the practice of dialogue in Plato’s works. Claim 2 is that because dialogue involves values in its activity, adhering to norms of dialogue can foster virtuous behaviours simply in so far as participants adhere (well and repeatedly) to the rules of the game. Taken together, these claims loosen the grip of the results-driven focus on an elusive end-product, which supposedly contains all the ethical value. Though dialogue aims at definitions, or virtue, the activity itself also has value and, according to Socrates in the Apology, it has the greatest value for human beings (it is the ‘greatest good’, megiston agathon). I defend this claim by arguing that dialogue is the greatest good because it is thinking aloud, and the virtues are excellences of dialogue/thinking (Claim 3).