How to Argue for the Error Theory

Abstract Richard Joyce’s new book, Morality: From Error to Fiction , is a sophisticated and enjoyable work. While the book’s ambitions and structure are similar to those of Joyce’s 2001 book, The Myth of Morality , there are also several important differences. This time Joyce’s case for moral error theory appeals to a collection of arguments of different kinds, and he criticizes his earlier self as well as J. L. Mackie’s seminal 1977 book, Ethics , for relying too heavily on one or two master arguments. We argue, however, that some of Joyce’s arguments, especially his critique of moral naturalism, bear closer resemblance to Mackie’s than Joyce lets on. We also argue that Joyce’s critique of moral non-naturalism is less persuasive than Mackie’s. Finally, we briefly criticize some of Joyce’s ideas concerning the implications of metaethical indeterminacy.