Implications of Rejecting Common‐Sense Realism for the Practice and Aim of Knowledge‐Based Education

Abstract In this article, I assume that it is universally accepted that education—at least sometimes—should aim at knowledge. Moreover, I take my point of departure from the classical (and minimal) definition of knowledge in terms of justified true belief (JTB). I further assume that this definition usually rests on a common‐sense realist notion of truth, which I take to minimally entail that whether something is true or not is independent of our beliefs about whether something is true or not, and that we—at least sometimes—can know whether something is true or not. Given the strong relationship between education and knowledge, these assumptions might make one think that common‐sense realism has a strong position in educational research. However, it is clear that educational research has been heavily influenced by views in conflict with common‐sense realism. The aim of this article is to comprehensively describe the implications of rejecting common‐sense realism for the practice and aim of knowledge‐based education. I outline two strategies for opponents of common‐sense realism: (1) either to avoid the (realist) notion of truth altogether in the definition of knowledge or (2) to (re) define truth in the definition of knowledge in a way that avoids common‐sense realism. I conclude that both strategies entail radical implications for the practice and aim of knowledge‐based education. I end the article by discussing and responding to some of the concerns that have motivated scholars to reject common‐sense realism in the first place.