Reviewing Game Theory and Risk and Reliability in Infrastructures and Networks
Game theory and risk and reliability analysis are reviewed in the context of infrastructures and networks.Players maximize utilities in static or repeated games, determining equilibria or min-max solutions under complete or incomplete information.This review examines attacker-defender dynamics, resource allocation, and network interdependencies.It identifies gaps in earlier reviews, which insufficiently focused on risk analysis within infrastructure systems.The study synthesizes methodologies, highlighting game-theoretic advancements in defense strategies, system survivability, and network resilience.It further evaluates interdiction strategies in power grids and transportation networks, outlining future research needs.
Authors
- Jonathan Welburn (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8605-1751)
- Kjell Hausken (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7319-3876)
- Jun Zhuang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4830-6570)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-01-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3850/978-981-94-3281-3_esrel-sra-e2025-p6228-cd
- Primary Topic
- Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00