The Concept of The Integrity of the Person and Neurorights: A Review of Controversial Issues

INTRODUCTION. The article examines the evolution of the concept of the integrity of the person in international law. An analysis of universal and regional international legal acts, as well as cases considered by international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, confirms the dual nature of this concept, which consists of the right to physical integrity and the right to mental integrity of the person. The article pays particular attention to the challenges posed by the rapid development of neurotechnology, which require a rethinking of the concept of the integrity of the person, particularly its mental component. The doctrine considers approaches that propose either the creation of new, so-called neurorights, or their inclusion within the existing right to mental integrity of the person, protected by analogy with the experience of safeguarding the right to physical integrity. MATERIALS AND METHODS. The study is based on a comprehensive analysis of international legal acts and the case law of international judicial bodies. Its methodological basis comprises general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, induction, deduction, systematic approach) and specific legal methods (formal-logical, structural-legal, comparative-legal). Particular emphasis is placed on the combined use of the comparative-legal method and the systematic approach in analysing the protection of the right to the integrity of the person among fundamental human rights at the universal and regional international levels. In addition, the author applies the ‘stairs study’ method when examining the practice of international judicial bodies in this field. THE RESEARCH RESULTS. It has been established that the concept of the integrity of the person enshrined in international law is dual in nature, covering physical and mental integrity. It is shown that while the physical aspect has been developed in sufficient detail, the mental component has long remained in the shadows and has only recently become the subject of active discussions. It has been revealed that the development of neurotechnologies (neurostimulation, neurohacking, memory manipulation) poses threats to mental autonomy and cognitive freedom of a person, which actualizes the issue of the need for a new system of guarantees. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. The article discusses various doctrinal approaches to protecting mental integrity: from broadening the interpretation of existing rights (the right to respect for private life, human dignity, freedom of thought) to creating new special rights (the right to mental privacy, the right to cognitive freedom, the right to mental self-determination). The author agrees with the prevailing view that neurorights should be considered not as entirely new rights, but as a logical development of the right to mental integrity of the person. It is concluded that mental integrity should be legally defined and specified, by analogy with physical integrity, while considering modern neurotechnological risks, in order to ensure the effective protection of fundamental human rights and dignity.