Resilience and transnational financial regulation: proceed with caution

Abstract As global crises like inequality, climate change and financial instability intensify, ‘resilience’ has emerged as a central concept in international governance and law. The appeal lies in what scholars call the ‘resilience dividend’ – the promise that systems can recover and adapt when facing external shocks. This article critically examines how resilience has been adopted in international and transnational law, with a particular focus on transnational financial regulation. The article analyses the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)’ work on the resilience of central counterparties, which represents the most extended elaboration on resilience in transnational financial regulation. Rather than accepting resilience as an unqualified good, a more cautious approach is suggested. Resilience risks perpetuating existing injustices and reinforcing neoliberal structures by emphasising survival and adaptation over addressing the root causes of crises. Accordingly, resilience needs to be seen as an ambivalent concept that only through its specification one can determine its possible impact.