Malicious Attacks for Maximizing Island Numbers in Cyber–Physical Power System: A Graph-Theoretic Approach
This letter proposes an island-maximising attack mechanism to maximise the number of power islands in cyber-physical power systems (CPPS) by disrupting lines. Specifically, a single-level mixed-integer programming (MIP) model is developed with a graph-theoretic approach, which is able to divide CPPS into power islands, while intra-island line overloads are induced in a high-stealth manner with increasing load shedding and economic loss. Case studies conducted on modified IEEE 14-bus and practical 36-zone Great Britain systems validate the effectiveness of our proposed island-maximising approach.
Authors
- Xin Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6063-959X)
- Rui Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1516-9653)
- Jinning Zhang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6188-4108)
- Min Du (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-9806-841X)
Institutions
- United States Department of Energy (US)
- University of Leicester (GB)
- National University System (US)
- University of Sheffield (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Published
- 2025-10-09
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/jiot.2025.3619395
- Primary Topic
- Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00