The Selfhood and Temporality of the Absolute: Mary Whiton Calkins's Absolute Personalism

in her persistent problems of philosophy, Mary Whiton Calkins characterizes her conception of the Absolute, and her broader metaphysical commitments more generally, as being squarely at odds with “traditional philosophy and theology” (427). That tradition is one that posits the existence of a transcendent God who is timeless, immutable, and impassible. Against this, Calkins avers that the Absolute experiences time, change, and the kinds of affective states had by finite selves such as suffering, regretting, and longing. As she vividly expresses the point in the same work, “the absolute self is no God afar off, no supreme Being who decrees misery that he does not share, no divinity who feasts and delights in a distant Olympus, while below him his human subjects toil and sin and suffer” (Persistent Problems 433). Instead, the Absolute participates in almost the whole range of human experiences and emotions, an oft-stated thesis in Calkins's system of thought, which she variously dubs “absolute personalism” or “monistic personal idealism.”This article will explore some facets of that absolute personalism, focusing on the way in which Calkins understands both the personality and the temporality of the Absolute, and especially how these two are related. In a recent article, Emily Thomas has argued that Calkins understands reality to be a rigid block universe, one that is a non-temporal whole given all at once (226–27). Whereas it is of the essence of what is temporal to have a past and a future relative to which its present is situated, and thus to be incomplete and successive, Calkins “argues that the Absolute is not temporal” because “the Absolute is complete, and the temporal is not” (Thomas 226). When stated in this way, it is initially difficult to square Thomas's reading with what Calkins herself says about the consciousness of the Absolute sharing our experiences of the future and the past and including temporal experiences, even if that consciousness is not purely temporal.1 These initial difficulties notwithstanding, I am in broad agreement with Thomas's reading and will provide additional considerations in support of it. At the same time, I think that an unqualified ascription of a block theory of the universe to Calkins provides only a partial perspective on her account of the Absolute by overlooking her attempts, however successful they are or are not, to show that there is some sense in which the Absolute is temporal. One of my objectives in this article is to throw into fuller relief Calkins's explanations of how the Absolute both transcends time and has temporal experiences. My principal objective, however, is to explore the consequences of this view of time for what Calkins has to say about the personality of the Absolute, and more specifically about the kind of affective states she ascribes to the Absolute. To come to the point, I will try to show that Calkins's—using Thomas's language—block universe stands in direct conflict with her commitment to the human-like personality of the Absolute.Section 1 begins with a broad overview of Calkins's metaphysics and then turns to an exposition of how she understands the personality of the Absolute. Section II examines Calkins's account of the temporality and timelessness of the Absolute. Here, I argue that Calkins draws on something like the extensionalist account of the specious present to attempt to explain how the Absolute is at once changeless and a person who shares the human experience of change.2 Section III concludes the article by suggesting that Calkins's account of the temporality and eternality of the Absolute stands in tension with her account of its personality.Since even the most general features of Calkins's philosophy remain largely unknown to most scholars, it will be useful to start with an overview of the kind of idealism she propounds and where she situates it relative to those of her idealist contemporaries. There is no better entry point into Calkins's ontology than the opening pages of The Persistent Problems of Philosophy, where she lays out a labyrinthine typology of different kinds of metaphysical theories—a typology that she claims, partially on the basis of the putative authority of Hegel, to represent “all logically possible ground-forms of metaphysical doctrine” (Persistent Problems 397). As Calkins notes, it follows from this that there can be no new system, but only ones that “fall within the grooves already worn” (Persistent Problems 397). Calkins's defense of absolute personalism is largely done by situating it within this typology, contrasting it with other theories, and setting forth arguments against its competitors. Since this classification purports to be exhaustive, a refutation of rival systems provides an at least indirect proof of monistic personal idealism, the view that reality is a single Absolute self that is differentiated into a plurality of finite selves that are aspects of that Absolute. Additionally, the classification of all possible metaphysical theories is based on what each theory takes to be the “ultimate reality into which all else can be resolved and which cannot be resolved into anything beyond” (Persistent Problems 4). Tracking Calkins's approach, I will divide this into two distinct questions: What kind of stuff is metaphysically basic? And how many instances of this stuff exist?In response to the first question—what kind of stuff is metaphysically basic—Calkins provides only two options: an irreducible reality that is the “same nature as my consciousness” or one that is “radically” and “absolutely” unlike my consciousness (Persistent Problems 10). Though it is intended to provide us with jointly exhaustive possibilities, this division appears to overlook a third alternative (or many alternatives): neither the same nature as my consciousness nor “absolutely” unlike my consciousness. The degrees of similarity to human consciousness degrees that can be a than and jointly exhaustive What it is like to be a for is in some to what it is like to be a human and in some As that is to the and to these two of irreducible stuff of reality is like human is “radically” different from human consciousness. and human consciousness” the of what of but it the of how many this Calkins says that there are only two options: one and more than The she and the are a more than the as Calkins draws a and and to how many of to how many instances of these kinds of To is a of the universe is by many of about in the And these of are the they are all this is in that there are many instances of but it is monistic in that each is a of one of such as are as being and are both many and many like is as monistic but with many her metaphysical for what is most about the and and are the kinds of idealism that they will Calkins understands idealism in general to be the view that as as self or To say of reality that it is however, is not to say that it of point is in Calkins's of what she variously or is a and monistic of idealism that the universe with a of an To reality in many different of Calkins that this is an of idealism in that the of has no or self or person it or at least no self that is something and and different from the In to the kind of idealism of personal idealism that selves that are not that “the of or selves that are that are these selves are (Persistent Problems both and personal idealism the that all reality is of the nature of the understands this as a of the posits the existence of that are not of those The of a of idealism are out in in of not that selves with other but that the of or and that a of the is because the selves in it are and the conception of the universe as in or of different and more or to each To this conception the proof first that are that are third that more than one self be to In the he has a to his first idealism against both and personalism against third a a of of personal idealism as such are there is one kind of but they can be or The and monistic personal dubs personal and characterizes it as reality to be by a or a of all relative selves or (Persistent Problems is the kind of personalism that one and is to that monistic personal idealist the existence of only a single but Calkins against this personal to the that there in some many selves or to each (Persistent Problems is not the existence of a plurality of but the nature of these selves that draws the divide and monistic personal one as has the in some of partial and selves and I and all the one with The these selves the the the of At this point, the systems of and The first that the universe in its of a of The is the theory that reality is in its nature a single or which into the and of the as (Persistent Problems Calkins is not a or of but As has this that finite selves are not distinct from the Absolute but are or aspects of the Absolute of the of finite selves to the Absolute is the of this and in and done that better than I I will from it and to the point of Calkins's point is the Absolute, and more the Absolute as As have Calkins that the irreducible stuff of for the be the “same nature as my consciousness” or “radically” and “absolutely” unlike my consciousness. of the two is the Absolute are already given an of an in Calkins's theory that the Absolute is a one that is differentiated into a of squarely her within the of personal not that the Absolute is a person in a sense of that for Calkins and in her of work, that while reality is an absolute that reality is a and a self as as finite the is like that of the finite selves into which the Absolute is that the consciousness of the or that is the Absolute is “the same nature as my of is in the Persistent Problems of Philosophy, where Calkins that the as to the Absolute, what it in its to human To the absolute reality self is there is then to the absolute self a consciousness which is like that of finite One be in the of nature of the absolute self by the to to the absolute self all experiences and of the finite self which are to but not to to it which are with (Persistent Problems Calkins that the absolute be like human (Persistent Problems are to the Absolute as all those of experiences of human selves that are to our thesis in some of the experiences. that Calkins that the absolute experiences are at the of the kinds of experiences had by finite selves and the kinds of experiences that are with its one that its human-like experiences are in however, takes an especially view of which experiences are with the absolute she that the Absolute has experiences, emotions, and the of and and that it and The absolute because complete, all human experience as an of follows that the absolute self has all the experience that the human selves In a he shares our is in our our can the human but is by the absolute no can within the human but is by the absolute self has all the human (Persistent Problems of the experiences that they the of the kinds of experiences had by human the Absolute to of and experiences in some be more than the experiences of the finite selves into which they As as this conception of the Absolute it is one for which the of Persistent Problems of has by this point, for the of philosophy that Calkins provides the first takes as its the monistic is a complete, and the one where the Absolute is Calkins to the of monistic in of her it is to that she most in support of this of the In she a from and the where that the Absolute what and are and and (Persistent Problems In the that the Absolute what such what does not say is that the Absolute that have such experiences the Absolute that what these experiences the that the Absolute be the of such experiences, for it is only in these experiences that one can what they are this is because the of consciousness is only from a Calkins this point against the thesis that the Absolute is to can no more than one can it. as is as distinct and a kind of consciousness as (Persistent Problems complete, the Absolute all the experience that the human selves shares in human (Persistent Problems 433). is the of these experiences, and not that have that the personality of the of human consciousness and the consciousness of the Absolute that is in the Problems a that is Calkins's In her in for Calkins to a of Calkins by a of that is to of the view of the as a reality to the is with one that the universe is an of where these selves are of a that is and Calkins that this or is of a with the to the God of like an but it is of the to at what Calkins takes to be an of the personality of the Absolute. is from many of by its conception of God as with us human she has that the and to the Absolute, in the sense in which they are to human this point, Calkins that the Absolute in my for it is only as he experiences the similarity the experiences of the finite selves and the absolute self is in Calkins's from of an The of this are that “the universe is and in and that as in a in the of absolute personalism, Calkins to the features of the absolute once that its is like that of as it is the Absolute is an whole of not an that is the of Calkins does not from the human-like of the Absolute as self I as a and by I what I I as The Absolute have sense and The consciousness of the Absolute is to be on the of the consciousness of finite I to the to which Calkins to the of the Absolute to that of finite As have the Absolute is as in and the same kinds of affective states that finite selves has all the experience that the human selves shares in human (Persistent Problems 433). There however, one the human selves are temporal and in time, a future and of a past in The Absolute, cannot in purely temporal (Persistent Problems The temporal by its nature As expresses the point in of “the of the temporal as is in the of and is because of the of human experience that it is not, to the and of an absolute self not it temporal. that Calkins only that the Absolute cannot be which is not to say that it is not temporal at is and is in Persistent Problems of Calkins that “the absolute it the temporal cannot be that it have a and a temporal consciousness” is no for in the Calkins of the Absolute as both and the finite consciousness of and are to sense of the of a consciousness that is changeless but that has the experience of change, that is both a temporal and that is and that Calkins to this by way of the of the specious a that had by one of her In this I will how to some by on does and does not the specious to her of it to explain the way in which the Absolute and our consciousness of and My about the specious present will be a the present can be as a single point on a time that the past from the that the the temporal of our unlike the is one of of some time to to such that the experience of a given of consciousness some of In his of from the in this The present is no but a with a of its on which and from which in two into The of of our of time is a with a and a as it and a is only as of this that the of of to the other is not first one and then the other and from the of an of time but to the of time as a with its two in it. this point, the same that will be by a with all the of a to be in the even it is only a single that at an to a of from is to explain which is our direct experience of and is the of the specious not a that temporal on the of to are of the of a present that is not but that has some has one of at least two explanations of how the specious present more than the and I will that The view that has thus that our experience by of the that the specious present is as in the As has by one this that what appears to be within the specious present has an temporal then then all of the are as being which is not to say that they are all as There is a temporal within the specious is to as the account of the specious because that present appears as an experiences are and is both and into a single which appears to us as The of the specious present thus appears to us as a temporal temporal as the specious present as by does the experience of the of our consciousness present and as within the specious this, the of the specious present that that present is an it is but it is an present that to that has to of the past and of the that our experiences within of consciousness which an objective, but these they are by an experience and a (or of the recent The of is of a of to the the specious present as the past and future by a of what has and a of what will not by being an the present that those does not have kind of that for the and future of the same of the specious an for of which it in but it is to its most in Persistent Problems of and her of In the Calkins the doctrine” that the of or has first to show the that than and as Additionally, Calkins a kind of to which all are of a that what to be states to personal this that and even and not in the same way as human that her this an Calkins situates it in a tradition that and especially on theory of of and “the of selves of many or for a from with only to the that can human experiences as a by which to the of all of In our a range of of from states of to states of and as there are different of consciousness within our experiences, are there different kinds of of different of to this experience of different of our consciousness as of the of selves of many or there is to that are selves at one of the of the of the most in which different of selves from each other is in the nature of the temporality of experiences. of that have no consciousness of change, and thus no consciousness of that different of selves are of the past and future in different from is an of that are from each other by for the past and the future have no experience of the past or future at human selves in the specious where this present within this does not at human there are selves that to us as to and thus selves specious present more of the past and future than does As Calkins “the experience of the the of and thus the conception of selves with or that even to I will only to on and below Calkins's of the of is an of what Calkins had argued for in Persistent Problems of In this work, by on Calkins that there are finite selves who to us as to specious present is on the of or of selves its at the of the in an self who is a is to the whole of the in Persistent Problems as is to our specious that present is the of the In support of this Calkins the from in a however is already in a way that is not it is at consciousness to the whole of as our human consciousness is to a single is an in Persistent Problems eternality of the an eternality that is intended to be with the Absolute time and change, is one in which its present is “the whole of the in the same way that our present is a of a within it more than the as experience a in our specious Calkins does the Absolute experience a within its specious The specious present is an experience that is at least the of and it as Calkins herself one that the reality of is in this way that Calkins to explain how the Absolute is of the universe both the temporal and as a (Persistent Problems that the a reading of Calkins that her as for an a to the specious it is that some of the have can be as the I think that there is a to that Calkins does not the of the past and future as a of a past and a of a future at an In on she to the of the past and future as being of of which are a more with that the specious present is a of is have that her of the eternality shares many with that of In the that Calkins from and the that a suggesting that this is more than an of the past and In other is that the specious present is not an with no present time, no is no time at all in a no no no or takes if the present is a of time, then it within as the of time such the of an time, in such an or within the if as a of the there are of and those are they the arguments that Calkins herself by from and the And they are of a with the of Calkins's theory of the Absolute, especially her that the Absolute experience change, something not as for if the one specious present of the Absolute is a present this I will by the to which this of the experience of time is with it experiences in the of consciousness” that have (Persistent Problems To this can start be that an of the human experience of time is its division into the of and not of and which not Calkins this in her of temporal experiences as ones of what is and what is no of what is to be but is not and of what is (Persistent Problems To be our specious present of the past and the but only is thus a present in the of the there are past and future that of it. That of and future are to the human experience of time the specious present does not that has and that has to relative to our specious there is a past of what is no and a future of what is not As finite our experiences of time us a future to come against a of a past that has to our present is one even if it of the past and the on a future and an past at that one does not to the theory of The of the and temporal are of our are however, in the of the specious present of the Absolute, even as Calkins understands that present is one in which all are given at it is a of that are within that of time are in the specious present of the Absolute in a way that they are not for “the Absolute be as of what appears to finite selves as and (Persistent Problems follows from the that the present the of the point that Calkins in on and this being the it is to the that the specious present of the Absolute, as a is not a present in the sense of the a present that is with the Absolute temporal is by idealist the of is the the is a single not the And if the not the of the for that the of the That are with the of is if the is there is no the is a no single can be the of the universe is a at all an of with which begins this the as there is no to think that one cannot the of the time of the specious present in a the other his that what the of the Absolute is to a in which there is no or I time is for the Absolute in a way that it is not from the perspective of the specious present that finite selves as the Absolute cannot experience the of time by finite the of the Absolute is one in which are and to of and these kinds of of a is at and at even and are they not the experience of the of the or the of the the there is a to be that the least the human-like the Absolute is that Calkins that the Absolute shares our affective emotions, including regretting, and being to that she in Persistent Problems of is not the to which it sense for a person for and all are present at once to have such That is because a whole range of that have are based our of as being in the past or in the As argued in what are about is the not the or of an generally, our is as that at least are and future have a different and for us because they are or more recent of this point, is only the other are some the future and the the past or however, is what the Absolute is our the Absolute does not a in which it in two into the Absolute, to the is at once of what appears to finite selves as and future Persistent Problems appears to that a whole range of that have are not the kinds of that be by the Absolute. As the point, being of past and future is of the same as its of what is is not the kind of of those temporal is to only a of time, the present in the Calkins that her conception of the personality of the Absolute to “traditional philosophy and theology” that a transcendent God from the human of misery and (Persistent Problems In its she to forth a conception of the Absolute as more in the of finite selves into which it including by a range of affective by those finite In her as they to be an of two different and not the personality of the Absolute if what I have argued is its not being in the of The like a of the “traditional philosophy and theology” that Calkins and of a with the kind of Being that she in most other Calkins's remain of and as they throw into relief the tension the Absolute as both of temporal and as more she to the from the timelessness of the Absolute and us in the a more of its