Qualitative Naturalism as Dewey's Ultimate Solution to the Mind-Body Problem

Despite the common perception that Dewey dismissed,1 dissolved,2 or simply did not care3 about the mind-body problem, it is in Dewey's metaphysical 1925/1929 magnum opus Experience and Nature (LW 1) where his general philosophy of mind is stated most explicitly with the mind-body problem at the center. This allowed Thomas Alexander to label chapters 7 and chapter 8 as “Dewey's ‘De Anima’” (Alexander, John Dewey's Theory 292). But what exactly is Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem?There seems to be a widespread agreement that Dewey's “postulate of continuity” (LW 12:31–32) or his “‘emergent’ theory of mind” (LW 1:207) is that very solution.4 On the one hand, Dewey himself seems to suggest such an interpretation, when already in the Preface to Experience and Nature, he says that “[r]estoration of continuity is shown to do away with the mind-body problem” (LW 1:8). Later, in chapter 7, Dewey claims that “the ‘solution’ of the problem of mind-body is to be found in a revision of the preliminary assumptions about existence which generate the problem” (LW 1:202). Prima facie, it seems that the above-mentioned quotes present themselves as one and the same thing that is just stated in different words. It also seems that it was Dewey's original intention to have it this way because the just-mentioned quote from chapter 7 is referred by Dewey as an “introductory statement” from the Preface (represented by the first quote). But are they the same solution or in fact different ones? In my paper, I claim that, in fact, they are different solutions and that one is preceded by the other. If this is the case, then what exactly constitutes their main difference?The main thesis of my paper is the following: Dewey's ultimate solution to the mind-body problem is grounded not in his emergentist metaphysics per se but rather in his metametaphysical qualitative naturalism. The latter precedes Dewey's emergent theory of mind, as postulated in his Experience and Nature. Thus, Dewey's emergentism is rather a consequence of his qualitative naturalism. As such, Dewey's ultimate metametaphysical solution to the mind-body problem precedes his emergentist metaphysics, and not vice versa.This paper consists of two parts. In Part 1, I will critically overview and dig into what I call the “Alexander-Rorty debate,” which is a debate between the two major Dewey scholars Thomas Alexander and Richard Rorty about Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem. In Part 2, I will provide the metametaphysical reading of Dewey's solution to the problem as an alternative to both Rorty's and Alexander's interpretations.One of the first analyses of Dewey's own treatment of the mind-body problem was done by the neo-pragmatist philosopher and Dewey scholar Richard Rorty. In his 19775 paper “Dewey's Metaphysics,” Rorty addresses Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem directly. Another major Dewey scholar, Thomas Alexander, in his 1987 book John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience and Nature critically responds to Rorty's interpretation of Dewey's solution, which establishes a debate between the two scholars that I would like to call the “Alexander-Rorty debate.” It is this debate that I would like to focus on in Part 1.This overview has the following structure. I will start with a short account of Rorty's critique of Dewey's metaphysics (section 1.1). Then I will proceed toward Alexander's critical attack on Rorty that marks the beginning of the debate (section 1.2). Section 1.3 will deal with Rorty's quasi-Kantian reading of Dewey as well as point out its problematic aspects. Section 1.4 will dig into Alexander's emergentist reading of Dewey and the problems that it poses.Rorty's article “Dewey's Metaphysics” can roughly be divided into two parts. In Part 1, Rorty is talking about Dewey's metaphysics in general. It is Part 2 of the essay where Rorty is directly addressing Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem as an instance of his general criticism of Dewey's metaphysics. Overall, Rorty sees Dewey's metaphysics as the confusion of two ways of rejecting philosophical dualisms: a Hegelian sociological or historicist way, and a Lockean empirical or naturalistic way. The Hegelian way is about showing that it is due to some specific cultural circumstances that dualisms still exist even though their usefulness has been outlived (“Dewey's Metaphysics” 82). The Lockean way emphasizes continuity between lower (natural, physiological) and higher (experiential, psychological) processes. In other words, Dewey simultaneously attempted to be “as naturalistic as Locke” and “as historicist as Hegel” (82). For Rorty, having a conjunction between these two approaches is indeed possible6 as long as one keeps them separate because “these two lines of thought neither intersect nor conflict” (82). On the one hand, it would have helped Dewey with his original war with the traditional epistemological problems. On the other hand, metaphysics itself will be left with not much to deal with. But since Dewey did not accept the idea of philosophy as a therapy whose mission was to make itself obsolete and instead wanted to discover the true generic traits of experience, this is exactly where the problems for Dewey began, according to Rorty (“Dewey's Metaphysics” 82–83). A particular application of such critique was Dewey's treatment of the mind-body problem.In his John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience and Nature, Thomas Alexander attempts a holistic analysis of Dewey's philosophy, including his metaphysics. Richard Rorty's above-mentioned article about Dewey's metaphysics is also under Alexander's critical scrutiny. In chapter 3, “Metaphysics of Experience,” Alexander critically addresses Rorty's take on Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem, Like Croce, Rorty believes that Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem was merely to introduce a hyphen and posit an entity called “body-mind.” In summary, for Rorty we should disregard the Dewey who presents us with “answers” to the experience-nature problem, the mind-body problem, or who speaks of philosophy as committed to a serious inquiry into the general meanings governing human existence. This renders, I believe, the critical side of Dewey's philosophy without and Rorty's have into focus the of Dewey's metaphysics and metaphysical in to other of his (Alexander, John Dewey's Theory the one hand, Alexander Rorty's to to Dewey's metaphysics, including the mind-body problem. On the other hand, Alexander Rorty for Dewey's metaphysics as and Rorty's interpretation of Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem because it was just about a hyphen and an entity called “body-mind.” But was Rorty's interpretation of Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem as as Alexander it to where Alexander that Rorty's It like this is the very from Rorty's paper that Alexander in the way shown Dewey wanted not merely but also metaphysical The that was in Experience and Nature and its solution to the mind-body problem one of the because the of to which Dewey is the same at which and the of is the of the by the of two “Dewey's Metaphysics” is to exactly from this Alexander Rorty that Dewey the mind-body problem by merely a hyphen and In the Rorty not a or at an interpretation not but also It that it was who Alexander to this idea to Rorty in the first this in mind, we to at Rorty's interpretation of Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem in his own Rorty the most problematic in Dewey's solution to the mind-body is not the hyphen and mind but the of Rorty that it is a of that will who do not a mind-body problem and who (“Dewey's Metaphysics” But what exactly is the problem with on Rorty's it like Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem is epistemological metaphysical and It is as for one between the as well as between and their have been to to (“Dewey's Metaphysics” But then Rorty this Dewey to because the problem between the and the can be when we the to both (“Dewey's Metaphysics” instead of the metaphysical Dewey himself seems to have in its exactly Dewey into Rorty, Dewey was because he wanted to on two at the same these are and Thus, what as “the of the empirical by of under has been by Dewey into between and (“Dewey's Metaphysics” the same Dewey attempted to like with the and to both and A naturalistic was his about human perception and from the point of of a a was stated his to the generic traits of existence. of this to a where Dewey's like and to as as the (“Dewey's Metaphysics” As a we at the same of where the is by the of two In other words, Rorty Dewey of what Dewey himself was an of according to and to the mind-body problem as such (“Dewey's Metaphysics” the its own because both the Lockean as well as the Hegelian that Dewey wanted to be with with his for the generic traits of and an as the main solution to the mind-body problem itself as its consequence (“Dewey's Metaphysics” Dewey should have been Hegelian and simply without to experience, or both (“Dewey's Metaphysics” The is to the metaphysical and the traditional metaphysical including the mind-body problem, and at the same to them In this case, one is simply on a simultaneously it This is Rorty's of Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem in a I to that such a is Dewey neither a Lockean nor a Hegelian and he did not a Rorty's but instead a rather different Dewey not accept the Lockean way of rejecting philosophical dualisms because is on a of into and This from which is a not for the but also as an philosophical with a specific metaphysical In this I do not that in to in us and other and or I that one away and indeed the and but not the or the these are but just as and are but we the and the the which are to be in do not have other existence in and that of us they are but and of by as are of the or have are and in they are what we call Rorty seems to take such a for because Dewey's above-mentioned of between and which for Rorty constitutes the very in Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem, is as to (“Dewey's Metaphysics” But Dewey did not accept the of into and Dewey attempted a of the of been by and in Thus, do not the of the but rather are in the of problematic and for Dewey that would the as This is I Dewey's quote that the they of in which both and (LW a quote that Rorty be In other words, Dewey not a to the If this was the case, then these would have been in the the that Dewey to But Dewey to that the are out in the as the of or the and not the that exist to Rorty, Dewey's Hegelian way of rejecting philosophical dualisms is on that the beginning of thought is and is about the problems that deal with at the (“Dewey's Metaphysics” the claim that it is due to some specific cultural circumstances that the dualisms still exist even though their usefulness has been outlived and it is about a criticism of without it of an to or or both But Dewey's for the generic traits of a that both his Lockean way as well as his Hegelian way of rejecting philosophical dualisms and a in the of Hegelian and the traditional metaphysics with its Dewey himself was in Dewey was not a of the Hegelian For Rorty, the latter is merely about a criticism of or without metaphysics. Thus, the Hegelian is about with the of philosophy and into the of the called which at a of the traits of (“Dewey's Metaphysics” It seems that Rorty's or Hegelian would merely be that of an Alexander, on the other hand, claims that Dewey's philosophy is that of and not Dewey's Theory which is to with. But I also that a analysis would that Dewey is a philosopher of both criticism or and Dewey's treatment of the mind-body problem is a very of it is where I would that Dewey's is most what it consists Thomas Alexander, it is Dewey's of continuity or emergentism that is Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem. though his theory of he to it at in most of his (Alexander, John Dewey's Theory Alexander it for what Dewey in the Preface to Experience and Nature, that is “[r]estoration of continuity is shown to do away with the mind-body problem” (LW 1:8). when Rorty the of Dewey's idea of continuity in and not (“Dewey's Metaphysics” Alexander claims that the idea of continuity has of the main on Dewey's idea of continuity was that of Dewey's Theory the most of Dewey's of continuity not in Experience and Nature in itself is both an inquiry into and an application of the very Dewey's Theory but in Dewey's The Theory of Alexander the On the one hand, it is the that in this the above-mentioned of a that Dewey's continuity is to the of Dewey's Theory On the other hand, Alexander emphasizes that Dewey's of continuity is not Dewey's idea of continuity the of and that are to Dewey's Theory but is also on as such is to Alexander, is in is in Dewey's Theory Experience is of because it is in Dewey's Theory If continuity then is a conjunction that two then and experience, then But exactly are and with will that be a Alexander's this would be Dewey's of Alexander claims that Dewey his idea of continuity his of Dewey's Theory But what are the are and as such the following are and the beginning of the philosophical Dewey's Theory are or that are are they both and are present themselves as and since they are also of the most of a is that of or As such, this is that it and marks out Dewey's Theory It neither in the nor in the but is rather in the itself and is of it This is where Alexander the quote from Dewey that Rorty as Dewey's solution to the mind-body problem and which the they of in which both and (LW But can Alexander Rorty's do two of have when they are not (“Dewey's Metaphysics” It seems that Alexander Dewey's Theory addresses Rorty's in the following way. The main point of Dewey's philosophy is that when such problems are that when we at and as and the problems in Thus, it seems that Rorty's was to and as and instead of at them as of the of the the same Alexander that, according to as of (LW are Alexander's Rorty's I still problematic because it to us where or is also not very much Dewey did original idea of The from Dewey's article and that Alexander quotes to his claim with the following it is to the of as a of it has to be in a different from that of its (LW If Dewey claims explicitly that it be in a different from the then can it be the that “Dewey's of continuity is grounded on the of as Alexander Dewey's Theory one can that Dewey was rather by idea of that its original account is seems to be the problem. Dewey also The from Dewey's on which Alexander his interpretation of the of continuity with the following and of from to the of continuity” (LW Alexander indeed that Dewey's of continuity a but at the same it of and Dewey's Theory But is it to the It also seems that what Dewey is talking about in this quote from his is what in his essay for a of he called “the of continuity or or “the of what Dewey by the latter of that of indeed can a to idea of or from to as well as a to continuity and But is with idea of In the on is an about this was very of as a that for the of to have as to his theory from or into In case, was also serious on this was a thing or a it a of Dewey himself an idea of As his essay of on he was with this idea because as a and it is an toward an idea of that of well seems to be of such a since he says that Dewey the idea of as a or in simply to of Dewey's Theory But even Dewey to the of instead of it as the as to Dewey's idea of continuity was on idea of or rather it was merely by it still in other words, the is Dewey attempted the of idea of or he did his own idea of continuity it is the is it to to Dewey's idea of continuity as would it be to Dewey's of continuity as rather a of continuity which is on the idea that as a committed to in In other words, is Dewey's idea of continuity or or For I will these to Alexander, it is a that and marks out and because is The is an of a or the of that its emergent Dewey's But what such an It is that such an be with This can also be by Rorty's about the between and that of do they have when they are not should we these to the can be found in Alexander's article and where he says the following: Another that of and is also in Experience and Nature Dewey's from the of two the first was the between in by and to the The other was the that and their be in of This was the for the of as a whose themselves by the as a and to the where (Alexander, between the and the to the mind-body problem, and Dewey's emergentism is a for But If to an interpretation of Dewey's as of then it is also that such a would be with at In other words, it to it is that “the and of from to the very of Dewey's of is by a It seems then that Dewey's emergentism is not the of the and that it itself seems to be grounded in a that an existence of the in the first The Part 2, will into this very Rorty's Dewey should have Hegelian the and metaphysical problems without to them on their own But Dewey did not do this and instead into the metaphysics he in the other words, Rorty wanted Dewey to be a with at metaphysical because this is the way to the But I that Dewey did to the without a Dewey's to the mind-body problem be not as simply metaphysical but as 2 consists of the Section will the of that is in this Section will dig into Dewey's qualitative as his ultimate solution to the mind-body problem as well as some on Dewey's emergentism as the consequence of such a it seems that is and of to metaphysics with the of on the other hand, with the of as “the of the and of and as “the of inquiry that is with that but it is the of the is a of debate and Thus, in the is an on as with the of metaphysics, or its or one of the main is and are or have different these are but is also a way to as a of Thus, to this the latter is in that it not with its but also with the metaphysics itself I as the inquiry into the of the metaphysics. Thus, metametaphysical is the that is about the of the metaphysics and its it to Dewey's own or metametaphysical the is It consists not in about the that the metaphysical problem in but is also an to which is what Dewey himself to as “Dewey's I called Dewey's in and the that he “the of which is a of to of is a first the problem of we that is a problem of as is about and a is a theory about the is a problem about a problem. The problem is the problem of and do in the to The is the problem of we a problem, or in other the problem of we is to called “the problem of is at the the of as one of the where the empirical of such as and will a and philosophy and the solution to the of is not the way to or the problem but is rather the way to the of a In other words, for the of is the metametaphysical problem in a that it is about the metaphysical problem of but one or the latter the solution to the the same we can the which would of the do we have the mind-body problem in the first I that this is exactly the that Dewey is directly to But Dewey's is different from that of The mind-body is not as an problem” to be but rather as a problem that Dewey attempts to that at the or metametaphysical Dewey's metametaphysical solution is not just the way to the of a but is a to to the of the mind-body problem as such and what and the problem in the first Dewey's metametaphysical solution to the mind-body problem is his qualitative that us with the when he says that philosophy the mind-body problem “as with an But what exactly is about the that the mind-body problem is is what this to the one hand, Dewey that the mind-body problem is grounded on the the of The was by the which at a It was a of the of such as and and and with the or that by the not as but rather as (LW the of the in the following The of and as of and as of and left in these just as they since they are is to as we have to the traditional that the of is to the that the of was from the of left from the their existence not be they into a of the of this the problems the of mind and the and the (LW quote not the of the which can be in a and is the of but also it would to the mind-body problem as Dewey's was at The in to Thus, these like do but their existence not for the of This them to be as or what are called that exist in it is this that to the of the mind-body problem. It is also not to the problem of or the and do in the to has the same the the of then exist in the first when it is a when the take with Thus, the problem is the other hand, Dewey not to this metaphysical as is and attempts to it the of the that one can in the it is this call from Dewey to the metaphysical that I as a metametaphysical that constitutes Dewey's qualitative naturalism. It is that it is to the the of which would be which to the mind-body problem itself as it was stated it is this from that the mind-body problem (LW “the ‘solution’ of the problem of mind-body is to be found in a revision of the preliminary assumptions about existence which generate the problem” (LW The assumptions that be are about the idea that the of are just that have to do with it be that Dewey's is about the of I it was Dewey's intention to have as the consequence of such a metametaphysical revision what he himself called in Experience and Nature of (LW or “‘emergent’ theory of mind” (LW this the mind-body problem, and are Dewey's qualitative and emergentism This is where an idea of a qualitative into mind and have been into just of in which their and mind the of their meanings in their and and it is that is the to of them as such (LW The as such is the of the mind-body problem is grounded in the when the general of are (LW In fact, the that we of as merely the of are out and as such are the of (LW and mind are by that have as their and the of and mind on is or (LW what exactly is Dewey's I a which I the that Dewey was and the same of thought and that, from Dewey's what exactly is is the in which we and from which we are not just but are to of mind as by that it would be for us we or for Dewey's of the in to of the of and by a and the of the meanings that are to and and suggest the with the or But what this have to do with the mind-body problem per and suggest that just are and and that we both mind and in of Thus, the be thought of as a of of and and the mind would be an of of and the mind with the this into the of between two of and to a when the about a are to the about the from which it to a when the about a are not even from the about the from which it and of is Dewey's seems that the very between and is on the that Dewey was critical For it is that seems to be one and not the of a that is emergent his case, an of a that in the about the including the about and but would still to the about the and that, even though are still from the are and the that are not are But this to his essay and Dewey claims that the idea is an of the which was by the that and is of the idea that the is a whose be from its (LW it seems to that Dewey's emergent theory of mind is then neither of a nor of a since Dewey the very for the we can of Dewey's cultural emergentism as a of that is a consequence of his qualitative the idea seems to be a consequence of naturalism. this is just a preliminary and is Dewey's qualitative can indeed be as a way to the in Rorty's and at facie, it not to into a metaphysical and to as a of Dewey's qualitative is rather a metametaphysical It is a critical or to traditional metaphysics on the one hand, because it the metaphysical of the problem as such, but at the same it also attempts to or the metaphysical without simultaneously into it in a on the other it is this metametaphysical qualitative that seems to make Dewey's emergentism or the of continuity” that Dewey's ultimate solution to the mind-body problem was not his emergentism per se but rather metametaphysical qualitative that would to into the of metaphysics. But it is also to that some For some that Dewey's main solution to the mind-body problem can be as a of as Dewey's Experience and explicitly and Richard claims Dewey's own to this in his Richard Rorty directly Dewey's continuity thesis as one that to The problem with this way of continuity between us and is that it seems to the to the and But like to and to a such and Rorty's the it If are and in then it would be to the between and and be in Dewey's continuity thesis is a and two ways to Dewey's of and The in and the latter in Dewey did not the interpretation where and are by then what is left is the interpretation where the are to the to It is that sees the of this in Dewey's first essay of where the idea is that the have as much as its because the from is to It is also that directly the interpretation of Dewey's of continuity to Thomas Alexander Dewey's Theory of which that Alexander's emergentist reading of Dewey's continuity is also seems to take a to Dewey's and that it is due to that the mind-body problem and to this problem, we the into their in The of this and the idea that is is that of Thus, also that what I call Dewey's is just for and of inquiry be done to these