Adversarial prompt and fine-tuning attacks threaten medical large language models

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare applications offers promising advancements in medical diagnostics, treatment recommendations, and patient care. However, the susceptibility of LLMs to adversarial attacks poses a significant threat, potentially leading to harmful outcomes in delicate medical contexts. This study investigates the vulnerability of LLMs to two types of adversarial attacks-prompt injections with malicious instructions and fine-tuning with poisoned samples-across three medical tasks: disease prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. Utilizing real-world patient data, we demonstrate that both open-source and proprietary LLMs are vulnerable to malicious manipulation across multiple tasks. We discover that while integrating poisoned data does not markedly degrade overall model performance on medical benchmarks, it can lead to noticeable shifts in fine-tuned model weights, suggesting a potential pathway for detecting and countering model attacks. This research highlights the urgent need for robust security measures and the development of defensive mechanisms to safeguard LLMs in medical applications, to ensure their safe and effective deployment in healthcare settings.

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Publication Details

Journal
Nature Communications
Published
2025-10-09
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-025-64062-1
Citations
6
Primary Topic
Machine Learning in Healthcare
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
14.89

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article

Adversarial prompt and fine-tuning attacks threaten medical large language models

Zhiyong Lu, Furong Huang, Qiao Jin, Yifan Yang
6 citations
Nature Communications
Machine Learning in Healthcare
14.89
article

Adversarial prompt and fine-tuning attacks threaten medical large language models

Zhiyong Lu, Furong Huang, Qiao Jin, Yifan Yang
article en
6 citations

Abstract

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare applications offers promising advancements in medical diagnostics, treatment recommendations, and patient care. However, the susceptibility of LLMs to adversarial attacks poses a significant threat, potentially leading to harmful outcomes in delicate medical contexts. This study investigates the vulnerability of LLMs to two types of adversarial attacks-prompt injections with malicious instructions and fine-tuning with poisoned samples-across three medical tasks: disease prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. Utilizing real-world patient data, we demonstrate that both open-source and proprietary LLMs are vulnerable to malicious manipulation across multiple tasks. We discover that while integrating poisoned data does not markedly degrade overall model performance on medical benchmarks, it can lead to noticeable shifts in fine-tuned model weights, suggesting a potential pathway for detecting and countering model attacks. This research highlights the urgent need for robust security measures and the development of defensive mechanisms to safeguard LLMs in medical applications, to ensure their safe and effective deployment in healthcare settings.

Nature CommunicationsVol. 16(1)
National Institutes of Health (US), United States National Library of Medicine (US), University of Maryland, College Park (US)
National Institutes of Health, U.S. National Library of Medicine
Openalex Percentile: Top 1%
Machine Learning in Healthcare
14.89
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Adversarial prompt and fine-tuning attacks threaten medical large language models — Zhiyong Lu, Furong Huang, et al. · Nature Communications (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS