Ethical arguments that support intentional animal killing

Killing animals is a ubiquitous human activity consistent with our predatory and competitive ecological roles within the global food web. However, this reality does not automatically justify the moral permissibility of the various ways and reasons why humans kill animals – additional ethical arguments are required. Multiple ethical theories or frameworks provide guidance on this subject, and here we explore the permissibility of intentional animal killing within (1) consequentialism, (2) natural law or deontology, (3) religious ethics or divine command theory, (4) virtue ethics, (5) care ethics, (6) contractarianism or social contract theory, (7) ethical particularism, and (8) environmental ethics. These frameworks are most often used to argue that intentional animal killing is morally impermissible, bad, incorrect, or wrong, yet here we show that these same ethical frameworks can be used to argue that many forms of intentional animal killing are morally permissible, good, correct, or right. Each of these ethical frameworks support constrained positions where intentional animal killing is morally permissible in a variety of common contexts, and we further address and dispel typical ethical objections to this view. Given the demonstrably widespread and consistent ways that intentional animal killing can be ethically supported across multiple frameworks, we show that it is incorrect to label such killing as categorically unethical. We encourage deeper consideration of the many ethical arguments that support intentional animal killing and the contexts in which they apply.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution
Published
2025-10-09
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3389/fevo.2025.1684894
Citations
2
Primary Topic
Geographies of human-animal interactions
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
13.44

Funders

Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Ethical arguments that support intentional animal killing

Haemish Melville, John D. C. Linnell, Erica von Essen, Frans G.T. Radloff et al.
2 citations
Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution
Geographies of human-animal interactions
13.44
article

Ethical arguments that support intentional animal killing

Haemish Melville, John D. C. Linnell, Erica von Essen, Frans G.T. Radloff, Stuart J. Dawson, Andrea S. Griffin, Vanessa Gorecki, Christopher Alan Bobier, Frédéric Leroy, Samuel Shephard, Michael J. Bodenchuk, Liaan Minnie, Jerrold L. Belant, Daniel M. Parker, Alexander Schwab, Christian Gortázar, Kate E. Lynch, Christopher Hunter Lean, Tim Forssman, Celesté Maré, Yoshan Moodley, Sam M. Ferreira, Peter J. S. Fleming, Stuart Derbyshire, Daniel T. Blumstein, Robert Arlinghaus, M. Justin O’Riain, Andrew J. Abraham, Marcus Clauß, Graham I. H. Kerley, Gilbert Proulx, Danial Nayeri, T. Adam Van Wart, Peter M. Haswell, Jordan O. Hampton, Jeanetta Selier, Kurt C. VerCauteren, Benjamin L. Allen, Michael J.G. Somers, Stéphanie Périquet-Pearce
article en
2 citations

Abstract

Killing animals is a ubiquitous human activity consistent with our predatory and competitive ecological roles within the global food web. However, this reality does not automatically justify the moral permissibility of the various ways and reasons why humans kill animals – additional ethical arguments are required. Multiple ethical theories or frameworks provide guidance on this subject, and here we explore the permissibility of intentional animal killing within (1) consequentialism, (2) natural law or deontology, (3) religious ethics or divine command theory, (4) virtue ethics, (5) care ethics, (6) contractarianism or social contract theory, (7) ethical particularism, and (8) environmental ethics. These frameworks are most often used to argue that intentional animal killing is morally impermissible, bad, incorrect, or wrong, yet here we show that these same ethical frameworks can be used to argue that many forms of intentional animal killing are morally permissible, good, correct, or right. Each of these ethical frameworks support constrained positions where intentional animal killing is morally permissible in a variety of common contexts, and we further address and dispel typical ethical objections to this view. Given the demonstrably widespread and consistent ways that intentional animal killing can be ethically supported across multiple frameworks, we show that it is incorrect to label such killing as categorically unethical. We encourage deeper consideration of the many ethical arguments that support intentional animal killing and the contexts in which they apply.

Frontiers in Ecology and EvolutionVol. 13
The University of Sydney (AU), Australian Wildlife Conservancy (AU), Michigan Department of Natural Resources (US), South African National Parks (ZA), Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE), Stockholm Resilience Centre (SE), Nelson Marlborough Institute of Technology (NZ), University of Cape Town (ZA), Cape Peninsula University of Technology (ZA), University of California, Los Angeles (US), Bangor University (GB), Central Michigan University (US), University of South Africa (ZA), The University of Melbourne (AU), National University of Singapore (SG), Murdoch University (AU), University of Southern Queensland (AU), Ave Maria University (US), University of Zurich (CH), Aarhus University (DK), University of Namibia (NA), North-West University (ZA), New South Wales Department of Primary Industries (AU), Mammal Research Institute (PL), University of Mpumalanga (ZA), South African National Biodiversity Institute (ZA), Scientific Services (ZA), Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development (AU), Instituto de Investigación en Recursos Cinegéticos (ES), Life Services (United States) (US), Leibniz Institute of Freshwater Ecology and Inland Fisheries (DE), University of Inland Norway (NO), ARC Centre of Excellence in Synthetic Biology (AU), Integrative Medicine Institute (US), Terrestrial Ecosystem Research Network (AU), Emissions Reduction Alberta (CA), Norwegian Institute for Nature Research (NO), Oldham Council (GB), University of Pretoria (ZA), University of Newcastle Australia (AU), University of Venda (ZA), University of New England (AU), Texas A&M University (US), Macquarie University (AU), Nelson Mandela University (ZA)
Biodiversa+, European Commission, Norges Forskningsråd, HORIZON EUROPE Framework Programme
Openalex Percentile: Top 2%
Geographies of human-animal interactions
13.44
DOIOpen Access PDFOpenAlex
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.