Two kinds of political understanding

Abstract A number of philosophers have argued that citizens have an interest in “being understood” by others in the political community (Hannon 2019, Prescott-Couch 2021). However, it is not obvious what kind of understanding this is, and why it should matter in the political context. In this paper, I argue that there are two importantly different epistemic achievements that should go under the heading “political understanding.” One kind of understanding, which I label rational political understanding, concerns a grasp of the rational support structure of others’ social and political opinions, analogous to the kind of understanding we might have of an argument or a theory. The other, which Il call empathetic political understanding, concerns an affect-laden grasp of their emotions and lived experience. These two kinds of understanding are politically relevant for different reasons. Rational understanding is crucial for ensuring that citizens’ views are effectively taken into account in public deliberation, while empathetic understanding is crucial for facilitating identification with others in one’s political community, thereby promoting civic friendship. This distinction is helpful to clarifying normative questions about political understanding—for citizens may be owed rational consideration of their viewpoint without being owed identification. Moreover, attention to it is important for appreciating crucial distinctions between different kinds of projects in journalism and the social sciences aiming to provide “understanding” of other citizens.