Resilient Distributed Voltage Control of Networked Microgrids Against DoS Attacks in Communication Channel

The distributed control in networked microgrids (NMGs) significantly improves grid-edge voltage performance in distribution systems with high penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs). Even though a prior asynchronous distributed leader-follower control (ADLFC) method can withstand certain levels of communication delay and failure, the peer-to-peer communication of the distributed control method is still vulnerable to cyber-attacks, such as the continuous communication failure (CCF) event led by Denial of Service (DoS) attack. To address this issue, we propose an improved ADLFC method with a cybersecurity enhancement strategy, which can guarantee both the solution convergence and voltage control performance. When the peer-to-peer communication is disconnected under attack of the CCF, the proposed strategy can first detect the CCF event, then utilize redundant channels and backup computations to ensure seamless data transfer via redundant paths and task takeover by backup resources. We also build a DoS attack model to generate the CCF by considering the probability of each DoS attack request, as well as the resource consumption and recovery process of attack targets. The simulation results show that the proposed network security reinforcement strategy can ensure that the voltage deviation remains within a controllable range.