Resilient distributed load frequency control for solar PV-dominated interconnected power systems against PMU denial-of-service attacks

This paper proposes a resilient distributed load frequency control (DLFC) strategy for interconnected power systems with high penetration of solar photovoltaic (PV) under physical-layer denial-of-service (DoS) attacks targeting phasor measurement units (PMUs). Firstly, to address the uncertainty in the conventional small-signal models due to the intermittency and the operating point shift caused by renewable energy integration, the system dynamics are reformulated using an uncertain but bounded time-varying parameter matrix. Secondly, a probabilistic attack model is constructed based on Bernoulli random processes to characterize the physical PMU DoS attacks. This model is explicitly embedded into the DLFC controller design, enabling the system to tolerate intermittent measurement losses. Thirdly, a distributed robust controller synthesis method is developed under linear matrix inequality constraints, providing sufficient conditions to ensure mean-square stability and robust performance in the presence of measurement dropouts and parameter uncertainties. The effectiveness of the proposed control strategy is verified on a four-area interconnected power system subjected to varying levels of system uncertainties and DoS attack conditions. The simulation results demonstrate the strategy’s robustness and resilience in maintaining frequency stability and ensuring cooperative control performance despite adverse disturbances. • A resilient distributed load frequency control strategy is developed. • Time-varying uncertainties from PV generation are modeled explicitly. • PMU denial-of-service attacks are captured via a probabilistic model. • Controller design ensures robustness under measurement dropouts. • Simulations verify stability and resilience under adverse conditions.