Trusting but forgetting impressive science

Cultural beliefs and practices often spread because they appeal to existing cognitive mechanisms. This perspective has explained the cultural success of religion, fiction, rituals, and even medical practices. Science, however, appears to be an exception. Scientific concepts are highly counterintuitive, and people know very little about science, yet it is among the most trusted institutions. Here, we test a cognitive model of trust in science that is compatible with these observations: the rational impression account. According to this account, people trust scientists because they are impressed by their findings (even if they do not understand how they were generated), and this impression persists after specific knowledge has vanished. We present evidence for this model in two experiments (total n = 696) with UK participants. In Experiment 1, participants perceived some scientific findings as more impressive than others, and exposure to the more scientific findings led participants to think of the relevant scientists as more competent and their scientific discipline as more trustworthy. In Experiment 2, we show that participants have these impressions despite almost immediately forgetting relevant content. The rational impression model can explain why people trust science without remembering much of it.