REFLEKSIVNO-SUDNJI DAN (CRTICE O VEŠTAČKOJ INTELIGENCIJI)

In this paper, we begin with the contemporary tendency to dismiss the intimidating aspects of various innovations by explaining them away as something old and familiar. Such is the case today with artificial intelligence—its early traces can already be found in Homer. We seek to demonstrate that the elements of the model by which artificial intelligence operates can be recognized in Kant’s conception of reflecting judgment and in the figure of genius, and that there is nothing comforting about this. The central question concerns whether artificial intelligence can prove to be inventive and rival human inventiveness. To investigate this, we rely not only on Kant but also on the works of Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-François Lyotard, while also touching upon the insights of John Searle and Daniel Dennett.