Culture and tax compliance: a lab-in-the-field experiment in South Tyrol

Abstract Cross-cultural research on tax compliance provides two competing explanations for differences in taxpayers’ behavior. The institutional explanation focuses on differences in formal institutions (e.g., fines, frequency of audits), while the cultural explanation emphasizes differences in culture. We provide evidence from a unique setting where two linguistic—and cultural—groups, German and Italian, co-exist within an administrative region under one institutional environment. In our online lab-in-the-field approach (N=190), we conduct a quasi-experimental income reporting game and a within-subject vignette experiment to elicit beliefs. While the overall level of evasion is similar between groups, there is a difference in tax compliance when differentiating between the intensive and extensive margin: Italian speakers evade larger amounts whereas German speakers tend to evade more often. Perceived compliance is lower than actual compliance with German speaking taxpayers being perceived to be more compliant than Italian speaking taxpayers. We further explore the impact of randomized language priming and find mixed results.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Tax and Public Finance
Published
2026-11-16
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-026-10013-5
Primary Topic
Taxation and Compliance Studies
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

Culture and tax compliance: a lab-in-the-field experiment in South Tyrol

Matthias Cologna, Robin Scheuch
International Tax and Public Finance
Taxation and Compliance Studies
article

Culture and tax compliance: a lab-in-the-field experiment in South Tyrol

Matthias Cologna, Robin Scheuch
article en

Abstract

Abstract Cross-cultural research on tax compliance provides two competing explanations for differences in taxpayers’ behavior. The institutional explanation focuses on differences in formal institutions (e.g., fines, frequency of audits), while the cultural explanation emphasizes differences in culture. We provide evidence from a unique setting where two linguistic—and cultural—groups, German and Italian, co-exist within an administrative region under one institutional environment. In our online lab-in-the-field approach (N=190), we conduct a quasi-experimental income reporting game and a within-subject vignette experiment to elicit beliefs. While the overall level of evasion is similar between groups, there is a difference in tax compliance when differentiating between the intensive and extensive margin: Italian speakers evade larger amounts whereas German speakers tend to evade more often. Perceived compliance is lower than actual compliance with German speaking taxpayers being perceived to be more compliant than Italian speaking taxpayers. We further explore the impact of randomized language priming and find mixed results.

International Tax and Public Finance
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (IT), University of Cologne (DE), Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics (DE)
Libera Università di Bolzano
Peace, justice, and strong institutions
Taxation and Compliance Studies
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