Essence, Intrinsicality and Place‐Relativity

ABSTRACT Can we, in keeping with Fine's celebrated distinction between essential and merely necessary properties, account for essence in terms of necessity plus something else? One appealing idea is that essence can be accounted for in terms of necessity plus intrinsicality. However, as brought out recently by Zylstra, if intrinsicality is treated as a feature which properties and relations possess tout court , a necessity‐plus‐intrinsicality account will not deliver the goods on Fine's celebrated example of Socrates and the set containing him. I argue that, if we have available a notion of intrinsicality which applies to relations in a place‐relative way, we avoid the problem. I give independent motivation for the idea that intrinsicality is place‐relative and discuss the philosophical options for understanding place‐relative intrinsicality in a way that is suitable for a necessity‐plus‐intrinsicality account of essence.