Ontological critique of transhumanism

When philosophy and special sciences deal with human beings, it is necessary to take into account the objective qualitative characteristics of the social substratum. Nevertheless, contrary to this requirement, the ontology of transhumanism has an anti-essentialist and anti-substantial character. The transhumanist “principle of system's isofunctionalism” is in fact fully applicable only to systems of one level of complexity, and a system of a simpler level cannot reflect without significant losses the information of a system of a more complex level, which makes it impossible to accurately “write” a human personality into a computer. Any attempt to transfer a part of proper human functions to artificial models created from natural elements is impoverishment of a human being, destruction of human essence. Besides, the human body is formed in the course of the infinite process of matter development, so artificial intervention in the human bodily structure, based on always historically finite scientific knowledge, every time risks not taking into account some important circumstances for the normal functioning of corporeality.