Federalism and national security in Nigeria

Nigeria’s federal structure, shaped by colonial legacies, ethnic pluralism, and decades of military rule, centralizes security under federal authority through Section 214 of the 1999 Constitution. While this arrangement was intended to preserve unity and prevent secession, it has proven inadequate in addressing complex and localized threats such as Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, banditry in the northwest, militancy in the Niger Delta, and separatist violence in the southeast. This paper interrogates the nexus between federalism and national security, raising two key questions: how centralized security control has affected responses to insecurity, and to what extent restructuring the federal system could enhance security without undermining political stability and rule of law. The study is anchored on Marxist theory, which explains security centralization as an instrument of elite domination, preserving access to resources and power at the expense of marginalized groups. Methodologically, it relies on secondary data, drawing on existing literature, policy reports, journal articles, and official documents to analyse the interplay between constitutional design, fiscal federalism, and security outcomes. The findings revealed that while centralized control ensures national cohesion, it fails to provide timely, context-sensitive responses to local threats, thereby fueling the rise of vigilantes and community self-help measures. The paper concluded that sustainable stability requires hybrid reforms that devolve policing under strict constitutional safeguards, ensure predictable fiscal transfers, and embed strong civilian oversight. The paper recommended that the National Assembly, Nigeria Police Force, National Human Rights Commission, and fiscal authorities should balance security responsiveness with democratic accountability.