The stable-ist of them all? Revisiting the KS bargaining solution
Abstract While bargaining theory has been a valuable tool in social contract theory, theorists often neglect crucial questions concerning the stability of bargaining agreements. We discuss one way of ensuring broad compliance with agreements and find that, under a wide range of conditions, the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) bargaining solution is least susceptible to stability-related challenges.
Authors
- Justin Bruner (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0005-8090-3393)
Institutions
- University at Buffalo, State University of New York (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Analysis
- Published
- 2025-07-19
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf058
- Primary Topic
- Labor Movements and Unions
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00