Partial truth and subject-matter: a difficult marriage
Abstract The idea that partial truth is just truth of a part cannot be defended unless a theory of propositional parthood is put forward. Since it is known that truth-conditional implication cannot play that role, subject-matters have been used to fuel a two-component theory of propositional parthood. Can this yield a satisfactory theory of partial truth? We show that such an ambition conflicts with natural logical constraints for partial truth.
Authors
- Thomas Randriamahazaka (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6638-8376)
Institutions
- University of St Andrews (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Analysis
- Published
- 2025-10-03
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf054
- Primary Topic
- Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00