On polarization, incommensurability, and value-laden research. A response to Bjørn Hofmann, 2024

In this commentary, I integrate Bjørn Hofmann's thorough analysis of polarization in research with two considerations. First, Hofmann defines polarization as characterized by incommensurable positions. This makes his definition too strict, as hardly any disagreement in modern science, including the cases he discusses, is based on genuine incommensurability. Polarization in research is better characterized in terms of <i>perceived</i> incommensurability between opposite groups. This is not a mere terminological issue. In the absence of genuine incommensurability, talking about incommensurability to describe polarized debates only risks exacerbating them. Second, Hofmann reviews several explanations of polarization but includes only value differences in his definition. Because values are ubiquitous in research, the role of values in polarization should be better qualified. Hofmann's current definition risks suggesting that values are a special feature of polarization, rather than a common feature of scientific research. Switching from the incommensurability to the perceived incommensurability criterion would make Hoffman's definition more precise. Better qualifying the role of values in polarization would make it more consistent with the values in science literature and his own analysis. Both tweaks will help forestall possible risks in communication that could hinder attempts to smooth over polarized debates, including those attempts reviewed by Hofmann.