The Asymmetrical Political Ethics of the European Parliament: Responding to Undemocratically Elected Representatives from Backslid(ing) EU Member States

ABSTRACT This paper offers a novel, productive approach to political ethics in the European Parliament (EP), assuming some of its members (MEPs) are elected undemocratically in member states severely affected by democratic backsliding. It explores the normative foundations of how other MEPs should deal with undemocratically elected MEPs here and now, complementing long‐term institutional reform proposals to counter backsliding. Criticising a cordon sanitaire approach to undemocratically elected MEPs, whilst rejecting that all MEPs have equal standing, the paper grounds a principled third way. First, it offers an account of individual representatives' (rather than EU political institutions') legitimacy and authority and shows how this account justifies asymmetrical duties vis‐à‐vis democratically versus undemocratically elected MEPs. Second, the paper draws action‐guiding implications of this asymmetry for how democratically elected MEPs should relate to fellow MEPs. They should presumptively defer to and cooperate with other democratically elected MEPs, whereas they can and should deal with undemocratically elected ones strategically, as instrumentally necessary to discharge their own duties as representatives but also to protect the legitimacy and authority of the EP. Third, the paper argues that democratically elected MEPs should provide surrogate representation to voters of undemocratically elected MEPs but not to voters of other democratically elected MEPs.