A Historical, Comparative, and Policy Analysis of Simultaneous Elections

This paper examines the “One Nation, One Election” proposal through historical context, global comparisons, and policy analysis. It traces the practice of simultaneous elections in India from 1951 to 1967 and explains how political instability, premature dissolutions, and the misuse of Article 356 disrupted the cycle. Since then, frequent elections have imposed heavy financial costs, created governance disruptions through repeated enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct, and increased dependence on corporate funding, thereby raising concerns about corruption and crony capitalism. Proponents argue that synchronized elections could curb these challenges, enhance efficiency, and provide greater policy continuity. Critics, however, caution that such reforms may dilute federalism, overshadow state-specific issues, marginalize regional parties, and pose significant logistical hurdles. Drawing on comparative experiences from the United States and the United Kingdom, the paper situates India’s debate within broader questions of electoral design and democratic accountability. It further analyzes institutional interventions, including the Law Commission, NITI Aayog, and the 2024 Kovind Committee report, which recommended phased implementation, a uniform electoral roll, and constitutional changes such as Articles 82A, 324A, and 356A, culminating in the 129th Constitutional Amendment Bill. The study concludes that while the reform is normatively attractive, its feasibility rests on political consensus, phased execution, and safeguards to preserve India’s pluralistic and federal ethos.