How the European Union Fell Out of Love With Open‐Source Software

ABSTRACT This article explains why the European Commission diluted the 2004 European Interoperability Framework's provisions favoring open‐source software and open standards when it revised the framework in 2010. Using an extended Multiple Streams Framework with a technology stream, the study shows how pro‐openness policy entrepreneurs secured the 2004 provisions and why incumbent advocacy became more effective during revision. Drawing on annotated drafts and expert interviews, the study traces actors' lobbying strategies across the problem, politics, and policy streams and examines how technology‐stream developments altered the feasibility and political salience of competing solutions. The analysis shows how changing standards and licensing dynamics, incumbent advocacy, and declining political support for the earlier pro‐openness package enabled a new coupling around business‐model neutrality and licensing flexibility, diluting the 2004 provisions. Beyond the European case, the study informs debates on open‐source artificial intelligence and advances theory on institutional dynamics in regulatory governance.