Ֆրանսիայի արտաքին քաղաքականության փոփոխությունների ազդեցությունը Հարավային Կովկասի անվտանգային ճարտարապետության ձևավորման վրա / The impact of changes in France’s foreign policy on the configuration of the South Caucasus security architecture

Introduction Recent changes in France’s foreign policy priorities have a significant impact on the formation of the South Caucasus regional security system. France has historically maintained active political and economic cooperation with the South Caucasus states; however, the region has not featured prominently among the strategic priorities of its foreign policy agenda. Our study is aimed at the assessment of recent changes in France’s foreign policy, and its impact in the South Caucasus. So as to elucidate what role France geopolitically plays in ensuring security in the South Caucasus, the article has evaluated the specifics of France's military-political and economic cooperation with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The current changes in France’s foreign policy priorities Reviewing the priorities in France’s foreign and security policy began back in 2017 during Macron’s presidency, which was imputable to the tendencies in the rise of the instability in the European security system and that of the threats to the national security. The spread of Islamic extremism in Europe, terrorist threats, the Ukrainian crisis, the cooperation problems in the period of Trump’s first presidency, as well as the EU’s economic and migration issues generated new threats in the European region, which, in turn, provided a framework for Macron’s administration to review the national security and foreign policy priorities. In 2017, France published the Defence and National Security Strategic Review, which declared combating terrorism, overcoming the crises in the Sahel and the Middle East, as well as enhancing European strategic autonomy as foreign policy priorities1. The fight against terrorism in France was pursued through a tough policy towards Islamic extremism and control of migration flows. To overcome the regional crises, the operations “Chamal” (Opération Chammal) in Iraq and Syria, “Barkhane” (Opération Barkhane) in the Sahel region were carried out, as well as a significant presence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was maintained. And the enhancement of the strategic autonomy of the EU required a policy of supporting the integration of states into it by creating an independent European defense system. The next review of France's foreign policy priorities was done in 2022. The launch of the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict, the intensification of competition for dividing the spheres of influence in different regions, the competition in sci-tech superiority and innovation or the "technological arms race", and the transformations in international transport and energy lines of communications built France the bedrock to once again review its foreign and security policy priorities. With the publication of the 2022 National Strategic Review, France redirected its strategic focus from counterterrorism and the fight against extremism toward preparing for high-intensity interstate conflicts in the Mediterranean and European regions. The review emphasizes the need to counter hybrid threats, address the intensifying rivalry among great powers, and enhance the effectiveness of strategic deterrence mechanisms. Changes in France's strategic interests are also displayed in the Middle East. In 2022, France, within the framework of Operation “Chamal”, was already prioritizing not increasing direct military involvement in regional conflicts, but rather deepening cooperation with the Syrian Kurdish Self-Defense Forces, Iraqi Armed Forces, and Peshmerga fighting against the Islamic State2. However, the French military deployments, still maintained in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait, no longer play a key role in establishing regional security and stability in strategic terms. Building the EU’s strategic autonomy is one of the important directions of French foreign policy. The Russia-Ukraine conflict, the growth of US-China contradictions, in addition to Trump's presidency in the US, further increase the threats to the European security complex, thus making room for the need to enhance the EU's strategic autonomy. Within the framework of the establishment of a polycentric world order, France seeks to embrace the EU’s transformation from being an “object to a subject” of security provision, notably, to establish a European security system independent of NATO. This implies conducting a policy independent of the US, China, and Russia, establishing France's pan-European leadership in the EU, and increasing cooperation with other geopolitical powers in the sphere of common interests. In this context, the article also discusses the activation of France's policy of increasing the volume of military equipment exports and promoting joint production after the Russia-Ukraine war3. Trump’s policy may greatly affect the formation of the EU's strategic autonomy. Changes in the political course of the US current administration create new opportunities for France to unite European states around the idea of ​​building a new pan-European security system independent of the US. France has expressed particular concern over instances in which certain members of the U.S. administration are perceived to interfere in the domestic electoral processes of specific EU member states and to provide implicit or explicit support to right-wing extremist movements within Europe4. The fact that France's strategic documents define the goal of becoming a “driving force” (capacité d'entraînement) in the region, and a “balancing power” (puissance d'équilibre) globally as one of the main priorities of its foreign policy, also indicate the abovementioned5. The strategy of becoming a “driving force” ensues from Macron's European defense doctrine, which implies complementing NATO's territorial defense role in the European region, establishing a common military intervention force, a common defense budget, and developing a shared military doctrine for action6. As for the aspirations to become a “balancing power”, they are often perceived as an attempt to maintain equal distance from both sides in the US-PRC strategic rivalry. The Indo-Pacific direction is also in the shortlist of France's foreign policy priorities. This region is important not only because it is regarded as a novel powerhouse of global economic growth, but also because the majority of its naval bases are deployed there7. The Mediterranean ­ Red Sea – Arabian Sea – Indian Ocean – the Pacific route is the main itinerary for French naval supplies. Concurrently, France openly supports the implementation of two important projects that bypass Turkey: the “EastMed” pipeline construction project to transport gas discovered in the Israeli sector of the Mediterranean Sea, and the creation of the “India – Saudi Arabia – Jordan – Israel – Greece” economic corridor. The role of France in the South Caucasus changing security environment In terms of changing world order and growth of polycentricity, the balance of power formerly established in the South Caucasus is gradually being reshaped. After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, France is in a somewhat pursuit of furthering its engagement in the fragile regional security system. France's national strategic review does not anticipate any provisions on cooperation with either the South Caucasus, or individual regional states, only the section on European security priorities brings up the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The section on the EU's Eastern Partnership (EaP), where Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have received particular mention, it states that France should contribute to their stability and the implementation of structural reforms by vitalizing mechanisms for its economic aid and European programs8. Since France does not have a comprehensive regional strategy for the South Caucasus, unlike the Balkan, Indo-Pacific, and Central Asian regions9, it is of critical importance to understand in which broader security complex France has embraced the South Caucasus region. As per the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are included in the section on the European region10. And what’s more, in official publications there are no strategic statements referring to the three states simultaneously. As we have mentioned, the only statement highlighting the commonalities of the South Caucasus is the EU's policy of supporting the Eastern Partnership initiative. In this context, the statement in the document closely mirrors the provisions outlined in the European Union’s defense strategy known as the "Strategic Compass"11.Therefore, it can be concluded that France’s regional foreign and security policy aligns with the provisions of the "Strategic Compass", adopted in 2022 during the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union. Complementing the EU’s strategic approaches, France, after the launch of the Russia-Ukraine War, began enhancing its engagement in the process of the settlement of the South Caucasus regional issues. This is primarily due to the review of France's foreign policy strategic priorities in 2022. Increasing regional involvement in the South Caucasus does not imply that a new strategic direction of foreign policy is being set up, as is the case with the African, Middle Eastern, or Central Asian regions, but rather that the region is by and large considered a sub-area at the intersection of the expanded Middle Eastern, European, and Central Asian regions. For France, the weight on the South Caucasus is significantly increasing in the context of the implementation of its foreign policy goal of establishing European strategic autonomy and the application of restraints towards Russia. Simultaneously, the crisis in military-political relations between Armenia and Russia, as well as the increasing role of Azerbaijani energy and transport channels connecting Central Asia to Europe and bypassing Russia open up new opportunit