Long Goodbyes: How Do Private Equity Funds Manage Sell-Downs After Initial Public Offerings?

We analyze how private equity funds (general partners (GPs)) sell down their stakes in companies they take public. GPs earn private equity management fees and carried interest on public equity holdings. The average duration of post–initial public offering (IPO) holdings is three years, whereas lockups expire after six months. Private equity–backed IPOs perform well during the lockup, but we find no evidence that GPs add value for investors through the timing of their aftermarket sell-down strategies. GPs appear reluctant to sell losers, consistent with behavioral biases and agency effects. Long goodbyes are more likely when the fund is performing better, resulting in higher payments to GPs. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivanisha, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02043 .

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
Management Science
Published
2025-09-30
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02043
Primary Topic
Private Equity and Venture Capital
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Long Goodbyes: How Do Private Equity Funds Manage Sell-Downs After Initial Public Offerings?

Howard Jones, Tim Jenkinson, Christian Rauch
Management Science
Private Equity and Venture Capital
article

Long Goodbyes: How Do Private Equity Funds Manage Sell-Downs After Initial Public Offerings?

Howard Jones, Tim Jenkinson, Christian Rauch
article en

Abstract

We analyze how private equity funds (general partners (GPs)) sell down their stakes in companies they take public. GPs earn private equity management fees and carried interest on public equity holdings. The average duration of post–initial public offering (IPO) holdings is three years, whereas lockups expire after six months. Private equity–backed IPOs perform well during the lockup, but we find no evidence that GPs add value for investors through the timing of their aftermarket sell-down strategies. GPs appear reluctant to sell losers, consistent with behavioral biases and agency effects. Long goodbyes are more likely when the fund is performing better, resulting in higher payments to GPs. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivanisha, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02043 .

Management Science
University of Oxford (GB)
Openalex Percentile: Top 61%
Private Equity and Venture Capital
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.