Ensayo de modelización de la Decisión por Consenso Aparente en el contexto de organismos públicos

This paper seeks to develop a formal model of deliberation channels within specialist committees in two public institutions in Peru: the Ombudsman’s Office (DP) and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE). It examines how uncertainty is shaped through internal deliberations and how the professional incentives of committee members generate mutual interdependence. These actors pursue public policy proposals aligned with both their political and technical preferences. These preferences are interpreted by the setters –strategic actors within the committees– who synthesize the concentric consensus reached to propose initiatives for state action. The greater the value of such initiatives within the committee, the lower the uncertainty about political support, and the higher the likelihood of policy success. The article explores the occurrence of the Apparent Consensus Decision (ACD) phenomenon, in which the setter concludes the deliberation by articulating a decision that no specialist explicitly opposes.