Security analysis and improvements of semi-quantum summation models without measurement
Tian et al. (EPJ Quantum Technol 11(1):35, 2024) proposed three semi-quantum summation protocols that enable resource-limited participants to securely compute the sum of their private inputs with assistance from a semi-honest third party (TP). In these protocols, participants do not need quantum measurement devices to achieve secure computation. Although the protocols have been analyzed against common attacks to demonstrate their robustness, this study identifies two significant issues in Tian et al.’s work: a security loophole and a design flaw. The security loophole permits a malicious participant to steal another participant’s private input without detection, while the design flaw prevents participants from obtaining the correct summation result when the number of participants is odd. To address these issues, this study proposes improved semi-quantum summation protocols under the same assumptions and environment.
Authors
- Jason Lin (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8013-9923)
- Chun‐Wei Yang (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6300-1703)
- Chia‐Wei Tsai (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8075-6558)
- Chun‐Hsiang Wang
Institutions
- National Taichung University of Science and Technology (TW)
- National Chung Hsing University (TW)
- China Medical University (TW)
Publication Details
- Journal
- EPJ Quantum Technology
- Published
- 2025-09-29
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1140/epjqt/s40507-025-00416-4
- Primary Topic
- Cryptography and Data Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- China Medical University
- China Medical University, Taiwan
- National Science and Technology Council