A cognitive resource-rational account of epistemic injustice

Abstract We advance a novel account of the cognitive foundations of epistemic injustice. We argue that such injustice arises from the efficient allocation of limited cognitive resources to mechanisms of comprehension and epistemic vigilance. Given their goals, individuals allocate cognitive resources optimally to interpreting what is said and assessing speaker credibility. This rational allocation often yields unjust outcomes, especially when motivations to obtain accurate information are weak and social considerations predominate. We show that insufficient resources devoted to comprehension and epistemic vigilance can lead to the premature dismissal of what speakers say—an argumentative injustice—and to the lazy reliance on stereotypes for assessing speakers' credibility—a testimonial injustice. This reframes epistemic injustice as fundamentally about the distribution of cognitive effort rather than the presence of irrational or defective belief-formation. We conclude that addressing epistemic injustice requires creating environments that foster epistemic motivation and inclusive engagement rather than simply correcting faulty beliefs or reasoning.