Is there a third lost generation in Russia?

In the recent history of Russia, it is customary to distinguish two “lost generations” — whose youth fell on the turn of the 1960s–1970s and the 1980s of the twentieth century. A number of contemporary researchers put forward hypotheses about the possible formation of a new, third lost generation. Among the grounds for such assumptions are the growth of alienation in the context of digital society, the transformation of values, and difficulties in social self-realization. To test the stated hypothesis, the authors conducted an empirical study within a quantitative paradigm: a representative telephone survey of Russian residents was carried out in July–September 2022 (N=2500). For analysis, questionnaires of respondents aged 18 to 35 were selected (n=840). The results of cluster analysis revealed three stable youth groups. The first cluster (56.9% of respondents) is characterized by an optimistic assessment of contemporary conditions as the most favorable for self-realization; its representatives evaluate youth as hardworking, striving for knowledge and high ideals, and problems among their peers, according to their assessments, occur rarely. The second cluster (29.4% of respondents), on the contrary, experiences alienation from contemporary society: youth are perceived as lacking initiative and ideals, and respondents’ peers, in their opinion, face a wide range of difficulties, primarily related to housing and material well-being. The third cluster (13.7% of respondents) believes that modern society provides youth with the best opportunities for development, yet considers that youth do not seek to take advantage of them, demonstrating absenteeism. The relatively small size of the second cluster does not allow one to speak of the formation of a new lost generation. The results obtained contribute to the existing academic discussion on the possible causes of youth radicalization, as well as the prevalence of the phenomenon of learned helplessness.