The Moderating Role of Accounting Information Opacity in the Relationship Between CEO Duality and Audit Fees

This study aims to examine the moderating role of financial opacity in the relationship between CEO duality and audit fees in publicly traded Brazilian companies. The final sample consists of 179 publicly traded firms, with data collected from the Economatica database as well as the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM), covering the period from 2010 to 2024. Based on panel data regression estimates, the results indicate that the CEO duality variable does not significantly influence audit fees. Furthermore, it was found that, in the Brazilian context, audit fees are not affected by the level of accounting information opacity, even when combined with CEO duality. In summary, the findings suggest that auditors do not consider potential risks associated with financial opacity and CEO duality when determining their fees. The results are confirmed using relative remuneration as an alternative proxy for audit fees. Thus, this finding contributes to the national literature investigating the determinants of audit fees by providing, to date, the first evidence that accounting information opacity does not moderate the relationship between audit fees and CEO duality.