Marx's Concept of Life

Abstract This essay aims to reveal the conceptual unity of an ensemble of concepts of organic, animal, and anthropological life articulated by the young Karl Marx between 1842 and 1844. To lay the groundwork for my analysis, I begin with Marx's general account of “life as activity.” I argue that Marx articulates a hylomorphic theory of organic form in 1842 and 1843, and a Left Hegelian conception of organismal agency as productive activity in 1844. I then interpret Marx's organismic conception of “productive life‐activity” as the guiding thread of his scala naturae in the Manuscripts . More precisely, I examine how Marx distinguishes plant, animal, and human life through the organism's production of its life and the life of its species ( Gattung ). I then redefine Marx's concept of species‐being as the unfulfilled power of an animal organism to self‐consciously pursue its productive life‐activity as its species‐life. In making this argument for the unity of Marx's concept of life, I hope to clarify the Aristotelian and Left Hegelian roots of his materialism.