Epistemological Analysis of the Tripartite Account of Knowledge as Justified True Belief

Philosophers have dedicated themselves to finding an indubitable definition of knowledge for many years. The fundamental epistemological question that epistemologists have grappled with is: ‘What is knowledge, and how does it differ from belief or opinion?’ This question has elicited various responses from philosophers. The well-known classical, traditional, and tripartite account of knowledge describes it as ‘justified true belief’, also known as the JTB account. While many philosophers seem comfortable with the JTB account, some object to this definition by arguing that justified true belief does not constitute knowledge. In this paper, I argue that the tripartite account of knowledge as a justified true belief is overly simplistic. I maintain that the individual components of the JTB account are necessary but not sufficient for defining knowledge. There are significant and plausible counterarguments demonstrating that the JTB account is inadequate and needs to be strengthened to serve as a robust definition of knowledge. I contend that the Gettier cases present a compelling challenge to viewing knowledge solely as justified true belief, necessitating the addition of further clauses to the tripartite framework to enhance its strength. Finally, I explore the implications of my argument and stance regarding justification and knowledge, particularly considering the possibility of scepticism in our everyday lives.