A Study on the Governance Mechanism of Open‐Source Platform Ecosystem From the Perspective of Stakeholders

ABSTRACT The open‐source platform emerges as a complex and dynamic system, shaped by the intricate interplay and interdependence of a diverse array of stakeholders. Existing studies mostly focus on micro‐level aspects such as individual open‐source entities, projects, or platforms, and rarely rise to the ecosystem level to conduct dynamic evolutionary analysis on the governance mechanisms of highly heterogeneous stakeholders within open‐source platforms. This paper, therefore, constructs an evolutionary game model based on innovation ecosystem theory, with platform governors and complementors as the primary players. By quantifying the strategic choices of both parties under different profit scenarios, the study explores the system's stability characteristics. Additionally, MATLAB simulation analysis is used to examine the impact of parameter changes on the evolution of strategies and paths, elucidating the evolutionary stability of stakeholder strategies within the open‐source platform ecosystem (OSPE). The study finds that: First, incentives for complementors can effectively drive their active contributions, but continuous strong stimuli will instead cause governors to strategically reduce their intervention inputs. Second, the exposure of potential risks from governance inaction has a corrective effect on the behaviors of both parties: It not only forces governors to turn to active performance of duties to safeguard the long‐term value of the OSPE, but also prompts complementors to accelerate behavioral standardization based on direct constraint rules. Third, a high level of open knowledge sharing can create the dual dividends of a systematic reduction in contribution costs and a multiplier effect on the value of the governance ecosystem. This paper unpacks the governance mechanism from the stakeholders' perspective, providing a clearer understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of OSPE and practical insights for formulating its governance mechanisms.

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Publication Details

Journal
Managerial and Decision Economics
Published
2025-09-27
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.70031
Citations
1
Primary Topic
Open Source Software Innovations
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
1.69
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article

A Study on the Governance Mechanism of Open‐Source Platform Ecosystem From the Perspective of Stakeholders

Wenyan Wei, Junlin Zhu, Lei Ma, Baoqing Zhu
1 citations
Managerial and Decision Economics
Open Source Software Innovations
1.69
article

A Study on the Governance Mechanism of Open‐Source Platform Ecosystem From the Perspective of Stakeholders

Wenyan Wei, Junlin Zhu, Lei Ma, Baoqing Zhu
article en
1 citations

Abstract

ABSTRACT The open‐source platform emerges as a complex and dynamic system, shaped by the intricate interplay and interdependence of a diverse array of stakeholders. Existing studies mostly focus on micro‐level aspects such as individual open‐source entities, projects, or platforms, and rarely rise to the ecosystem level to conduct dynamic evolutionary analysis on the governance mechanisms of highly heterogeneous stakeholders within open‐source platforms. This paper, therefore, constructs an evolutionary game model based on innovation ecosystem theory, with platform governors and complementors as the primary players. By quantifying the strategic choices of both parties under different profit scenarios, the study explores the system's stability characteristics. Additionally, MATLAB simulation analysis is used to examine the impact of parameter changes on the evolution of strategies and paths, elucidating the evolutionary stability of stakeholder strategies within the open‐source platform ecosystem (OSPE). The study finds that: First, incentives for complementors can effectively drive their active contributions, but continuous strong stimuli will instead cause governors to strategically reduce their intervention inputs. Second, the exposure of potential risks from governance inaction has a corrective effect on the behaviors of both parties: It not only forces governors to turn to active performance of duties to safeguard the long‐term value of the OSPE, but also prompts complementors to accelerate behavioral standardization based on direct constraint rules. Third, a high level of open knowledge sharing can create the dual dividends of a systematic reduction in contribution costs and a multiplier effect on the value of the governance ecosystem. This paper unpacks the governance mechanism from the stakeholders' perspective, providing a clearer understanding of the evolutionary dynamics of OSPE and practical insights for formulating its governance mechanisms.

Managerial and Decision EconomicsVol. 47(1)
Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology (CN), Nanjing University of Science and Technology (CN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 10%
Open Source Software Innovations
1.69
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