When Threats Backfire: Overcharged Defendants Overestimate Their Trial Prospects and Reject Plea Offers More Often

Objective(s): Strategic overcharging involves threatening disproportionately harsh punishment to widen the differential between the potential sentence if convicted at trial (PTS) and the plea sentence. Though larger discounts increase plea acceptance, excessive PTSs can counterintuitively reduce acceptances when holding discount constant. Drawing on anchoring theories, I investigated whether PTSs anchor defendants’ sentencing preferences, alter case appraisals, and influence plea decisions.Hypotheses: I predicted (a) transparently irrelevant numeric anchors would not affect plea decisions; (b) a disproportionately harsh PTS would raise maximum acceptable sentences; and (c) higher sentencing preferences would increase plea acceptance.Method: Prolific.com adults read a felony-DUI vignette and rendered a plea decision. Experiments 1 (N = 247) and 2 (N = 193) presented irrelevant anchors (48 vs. 8 months); Experiment 2 framed the anchor as a starting point for adjustment or hypothesis-testing. Experiment 3 (N = 844) presented more severe, prosecutor-threatened PTSs (18 vs. 4 years vs. none).Results: Irrelevant anchors did not alter plea decisions, ORExperiment_1 = 0.95 [0.57, 1.57]; ORExperiment_2 = 1.01 [0.56, 1.80]. In Experiment 3, the 18-year PTS increased sentencing preferences (d18_vs_4 = 1.04 [0.87, 1.22]; d18_vs_No-PTS = 0.75 [0.58, 0.92], but paradoxically increased estimates of acquittal (OR18_vs_4 = 1.74 [1.25, 2.44]; OR18_vs_No-PTS = 1.56 [1.12, 2.18]), strengthened perceptions of favorable evidence (d18_vs_4 = 0.26 [0.09, 0.42]; d18_vs_No-PTS = 0.22 [0.06, 0.39]), and increased plea rejections (OR18_vs_4 = 8.25 [4.41,15.42]).Conclusions: PTS values may operate through distinct psychological pathways—altering sentencing preferences through less elaborative processes, but case appraisals via more elaborative processes. This challenges the rational-actor model assumption that treats PTS and conviction likelihood as independent, exogenous inputs to defendants’ plea decisions. Practically, overcharging may backfire from its intended strategic goal by causing defendants to overestimate their trial prospects.