Authentication Based on Quantum PUF
An information-theoretic analysis of secure authentication based on Quantum Physically Unclonable Functions (QPUF) is presented in this paper. The proposed model employs a secret key generated through QPUF to authenticate pre-enrolled user and device identities while maintaining secrecy and limiting privacy leakage. We analyze the system's robustness against an active adversary who exploits publicly available data to impersonate legitimate users with fraudulent inputs. Our analysis focuses on characterizing the capacity region of the adversary's false acceptance exponent alongside the privacy leakage under reliability conditions. We further demonstrate that the achievable capacity region in the quantum domain surpasses that of classical systems. Additionally, we derive an optimal trade-off among the false acceptance exponent, public storage rate, and privacy leakage rate, offering key insights into the system's asymptotic performance.
Authors
- Holger Boche (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8375-8946)
- Christian Deppe (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2265-4887)
- Kumar Nilesh (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5743-8391)
Institutions
- Technical University of Munich (DE)
- Technische Universität Braunschweig (DE)
Publication Details
- Published
- 2025-06-08
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1109/icc52391.2025.11161044
- Citations
- 6
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 13.62