Moderate republicanism and the equivalent judgments thesis
The first horn of Moen’s (2024) republican dilemma is the claim that moderate versions of the republican theory of freedom make judgments about freedom that are equivalent to the judgments generated by the pure negative theory of freedom. This article challenges the claim. Drawing on a moderate version of the republican theory Ingham and Lovett, the article explains why a dominating agent's power of interference need not restrict the dominating agent's menu of conjunctively exercisable opportunities—the measure of freedom according to the pure negative theory—contrary to the arguments made for the equivalent judgments thesis.
Authors
- Sean Ingham (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7581-707X)
Institutions
- University of California San Diego (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- European Journal of Political Theory
- Published
- 2025-09-25
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1177/14748851251378939
- Primary Topic
- Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00