Attacking Split-and-Lookup-Based Primitives Using Probabilistic Polynomial System Solving

In recent years, many hash functions have been introduced to satisfy the pressing need of some zero-knowledge protocols for such primitives allowing a low degree verification of their round function when arithmetized over a large field.While this can be achieved by restricting their sub-components to low-degree functions (and their inverse), the newest primitives in this category also leverage the intricacies of some proof systems to use “Split-and-Lookup” non-linear functions that essentially apply a small S-box in parallel over the binary representation of a field element.Such components excel at hindering attacks relying on polynomial system solving, but they offer poor security against statistical attacks. On the other hand, low degree monomials offer the opposite guarantees, being strong against statistical attacks. Several primitives have recently been proposed that combine such components in different ways in order to get the best from both.In this paper, we target such primitives by relying on the low degree components to allow a low-cost polynomial solving step. The weakness of Split-and-Lookups against linear attacks is used to simplify these systems, and their weakness against differential attacks is then used to propagate across many rounds the differential patterns obtained during polynomial solving. We instantiate this general approach by attacking round-reduced Monolith, and providing a distinguisher on full-round Skyscraper. These result then shed some light on how to best combine the different types of components to achieve the highest security.